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INTRODUCTION
Despite perceived shortcomings and criticisms of misuse, class
actions are an important procedural joinder device in our public
justice system for bringing claims on behalf of a large number of
individuals when it may be economically unfeasible to assert claims
individually.' In the employment context for example, judicial class
actions have served as an essential procedural vehicle to address a
pattern of civil rights violations. Class actions are also vital in the
consumer arena to address relatively small yet widespread illegal
and unfair business practices that would "go unremedied if each
litigant had to fight alone."2 In a litigated class action, the court
plays a critical role in administering and presiding over the
proceeding to ensure fairness and to protect the due process rights
of those class members not participating in the case.3 The elaborate
procedural steps in such representative litigation-fairness
oversight, notice, adequacy of representation, and judicial involve-
ment in class certification-reflect important constitutional due
process protections.4 Increasingly, however, recourse to the public
judicial system is being displaced by a trend in corporate America
to require the submission of disputes to private arbitration rather
than to courts of law via predispute arbitration provisions in a range
of contracts involving consumer, employment, health care, and
1. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Natl Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,338 (1980) ("The use of the
class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for
named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be
brought otherwise.").
2. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD KM. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 6 (2000) (noting that courts and commentators recognize that class actions allow
"those who are less powerful to band together-using lawyers as their champions").
3. See infra Part I.A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) allocates important
responsibilities to the court to ensure that requirements of class numerosity, question
commonality, claims typicality, and adequacy of representation are satisfied. In addition,
critical judicial responsibilities in class litigation include: (1) determining whether to certify
a class; (2) overseeing notice; and (3) making fairness decisions in approving settlements. FED.
R. CrV. P. 23(c)-(e).
4. See infra Part I.A, see also Linda S. Mullenix, Can an Arbitrator Oversee Classwide
Relief? Seventh Circuit Rejects Plaintiffs on Classwide Arbitration, NAVL L.J., Aug. 26, 2002,
at B8.
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business transactions.' Arbitration is a private form of dispute
resolution whereby contracting parties have presumably consented
to a binding resolution of their disputes by a private arbitrator.
Under a typically broad arbitration clause, arbitrators are empow-
ered to decide all disputes between (or among) the parties, including
contractual and statutory claims. Arbitral awards are subject to
extremely limited review.'
The private arbitration process has been lauded as efficient,
flexible, and cost-effective, yet criticized as "an inferior system of
justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, account-
ability of judgment and rules of law."7 Despite an initial judicial
hostility to arbitration,8 the United States Supreme Court has, since
the 1980s, consistently recognized a "national policy favoring
arbitration" and relied on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
uphold enforcement of these contracts.' Individuals subject to such
5. The recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) further restricts
judicial class actions by prohibiting litigants from filing judicial class actions involving
national claims in state courts. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (2005).
6. See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-44 (1995) (stating
that once parties agree to arbitrate, courts must defer to an arbitrator's decision on the
arbitrability of claims); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899,903 (Cal. 1992) (espousing
the general view favoring the binding finality of arbitral awards); see also Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925,9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (allowing federal courts to vacate arbitral awards if procured
by corruption, fraud, partiality, or other types of misconduct).
7. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986); see
also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 38
("Arbitration is 'despotic decisionmaking' in the sense that the governing law makes
arbitrator's decisions virtually unreviewable while accepting procedural and substantive
results that would be considered unfair in a judicial setting.").
8. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24 (1991) (explaining
that the Federal Arbitration Act's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements ... and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts"); cf Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953) (refusing to enforce a
predispute agreement to arbitrate Securities Act claims because of doubts that statutory
rights could be effectively enforced in arbitration), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (discussing FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2000)); 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that the FAA's "[s]ection 2 is
a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1711
mandatory arbitration provisions have frequently challenged these
provisions as contracts of adhesion, procured by unequal bargaining
power and inconsistent with statutory intent and public policy.' °
These individuals are, however, generally deemed to have waived
their right to a judicial forum." In upholding compulsory arbitra-
tion, the Supreme Court has stated that only the forum is changed,
from judicial to arbitral, but the ability to vindicate substantive
rights cannot be impaired. 2 Yet, considering the arbitral forum's
insulation from the public judicial purview, proving that one's
substantive rights are unlawfully impaired in arbitration is
difficult. 3 Consequently, employees or consumers asserting claims
against corporate entities arising under not only contract law but
also state or federal statutory law must submit adjudication of these
rights to arbitration.
An essential characteristic of arbitration is the parties' perceived
freedom to agree to resolve their dispute outside of the constraints
of the public judicial system.'" Notably, however, the public judicial
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary").
10. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33 (rejecting appellant's numerous arguments asking
the Court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement).
11. See, e.g., id. at 26; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(noting that class action claimants must show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies for the statutory claims at issue).
12. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
295 n.10 (2002) (holding that the EEOC's "substantive statutory prerogative ... to enforce [
claims" could not be waived by an "employee's agreement to submit his claims to an arbitral
forum").
13. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement that is silent as to who is responsible for arbitration
costs is still enforceable, despite the risk that it may subject a plaintiff to substantial costs.
Id. at 90-92. The Court acknowledged that excessive arbitration costs could jeopardize
substantive rights by effectively precluding a poor consumer's resort to arbitration, but the
Court imposed a high standard upon the consumer to demonstrate evidence of inability to pay.
Id. at 91-92. Until then, the plaintiffs risk that she "will be saddled with prohibitive costs is
too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement." Id. at 91.
14. Considering the perceived efficiency of operating outside such constraints, the
magnitude of litigation over arbitration is ironic. One court observed that "cries for court
interference in the arbitration process are relatively common; so much so that cases submitted
to arbitration often result in satellite litigation in the court system." Vestax Sec. Corp. v.
Desmond, 919 F. Supp. 1061, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also Quinton F. Seamons, Does
Securities Arbitration Go On Forever? Eligibility and Statutes of Limitations, INSIGHTS, May
1994, at 17 ("[Alrbitration is becoming the litigation battlefield that it was intended to
avoid.").
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system has become significantly involved in arbitral disputes, and
federal and state statutes provide substantial support for enforcing
arbitration contracts. The FAA authorizes judicial involvement in
arbitration by requiring a court to enforce agreements to arbitrate."
The FAA also authorizes a court to stay litigation pending arbitra-
tion, to appoint an arbitrator, and to confirm an arbitration award.1
6
Although the FAA provides for extensive judicial support for private
arbitration, and the law typically accords arbitrators immunity
comparable to public judges, an arbitrator is not considered a state
actor within the meaning of constitutional jurisprudence, and
arbitration typically need not afford parties the due process
otherwise guaranteed in a court of law.'
Important questions arise, however, when the seemingly distinct
processes of class actions and arbitration intersect or merge, or
perhaps become altogether subsumed by each other. For example,
do the boilerplate contractual arbitration provisions constitute a
waiver of rights to proceed collectively, or to constitutional due
process, in a class arbitration setting? Both courts and arbitrators
are increasingly asked to determine the impact of predispute
arbitration contracts on the ability of individuals subject to these
contracts to sue, not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of an
entire class of similarly situated individuals-that is, to pursue a
class action lawsuit--either in court or in arbitration. Cases
involving mandatory arbitration contract provisions and class
actions generally raise one of three issues: First, do arbitration
agreements that are silent on the issue of class actions bar the filing
15. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (providing that a party "may petition any United States district
court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement"). The court may summarily try the issue unless the moving party requests
a jury trial, in which case the court must refer the issue of arbitrability to a jury in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 5, 10 (2000).
17. See infra Part II.B. Prominent organizations, such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), have promulgated due process protocols to address particular procedural
fairness concerns in arbitrations involving parties of disparate bargaining power, such as in
consumer and employment arbitrations. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE
PROCESS PRoToCL(998), available athttp://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019; AM. ARBITRATION
ASSN, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES
ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), available at http/www.adr.
org/sp.asp?id=22078. These protocols do not have the force of law, but they are recommended
practices.
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of a class action in court or in arbitration? Second, are arbitration
agreements that expressly bar class actions illegal under state
unconscionability law, inconsistent with other federal protective
statutes, or outright permissible under the FAA? 8 The third issue
involves the class arbitration process itself: what can or must the
process entail-particularly the effect on absent, nonparticipatory
class members-and what are the respective roles of the court and
the arbitrator?
For example, the case before the U.S. Supreme Court in Green
Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle 9 raised but failed to adequately
address these concerns about class actions and arbitration. The
Bazzle decision was a consolidation of two separate lawsuits-the
Bazzle case, which involved home-improvement loans, and Lackey
v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,2° which involved mobile home
refinancing-filed in state court by individuals seeking class action
status and statutory damages on the basis that Green Tree had
failed to make certain required disclosures in loan agreements as
mandated by South Carolina law.' In both cases, Green Tree sought
to compel arbitration of individual claims because the loan agree-
ments required the parties to submit all disputes to mandatory
arbitration.22 Prior to granting the motion to compel arbitration in
Bazzle, the trial court had certified the class of plaintiffs and then
ordered the parties to class arbitration.2" The arbitrator, in turn,
administered the class action and awarded the class more than
$10.9 million in statutory damages, plus attorneys' fees.24 In Lackey,
the trial court simply granted the motion to compel arbitration and
the same arbitrator conducted all aspects of the class action within
the arbitration, including class certification, notice, and a hearing
on the merits, and awarded the class $9.2 million in statutory
18. Another question that could arise is whether an express provision requiring that class
actions be brought in private arbitrations would be enforceable. Few contracts contain such
a provision.
19. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
20. 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
21. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349,352-54 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S.
444(2003).
22. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 448-49.
23. Id. at 449.
24. Id.
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damages in addition to attorneys' fees.25 The trial court subse-
quently confirmed both class arbitral awards.26 On appeal to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, Green Tree argued that because the
contract was silent as to the availability of proceeding as a class
action either in court or in arbitration, the order for class arbitration
was erroneous.2 7 In affirming the arbitral class awards, however,
the supreme court reasoned that because the contract did not
expressly preclude class proceedings, the efficiency aspects of a class
action were consistent with arbitration policy.' Accordingly, the
court held that the case could proceed as a class action in arbitra-
tion because the operative state law, the state consumer protection
code, allowed claims to be brought in a class action.2"
As the Bazzle case proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court, it raised
the issue of whether the FAA permits a court to impose class action
procedures when an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue
regarding class arbitration, but state law otherwise permits class
relief. Interestingly, in resisting class arbitration,"° the defendant
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 447-48. The arbitration clause read:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating
to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract ... shall be
resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of
you. This arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate
commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C.
section 1.... THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY
RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO
ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT
ACTION BY US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN).... The parties agree and understand
that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract.
These powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not
limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
Id. at 448 (omissions in original).
28. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349,360-61 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S.
444 (2003). The court adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Keating v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
29. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360-61.
30. Ironically, the corporate party, which typically seeks to enforce arbitration as to
individuals, resisted arbitration pursued by individuals on a class basis. Amicus briefs filed
in Bazzle showed the irony. Consumer advocates argued in favor of arbitration, apparently
conceding that arbitration was the only alternative for class claims, while the corporate
entities argued against arbitration, pronouncing the risks and arbitrariness of one arbitrator's
power in a class case. Consumer-friendly organizations such as the AARP, the Lawyers'
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1711
lending company, Green Tree, argued that such a process would
jeopardize the due process rights of unnamed and nonparticipating
class members and that the arbitrator lacked authority to resolve
the rights of unnamed third parties.31 At the same time, commenta-
tors questioned whether an arbitrator is qualified to administer a
class action and warned that the arbitration contract could be used
to eliminate class actions altogether through express bans.32
The Bazzle Court did not address many of the questions raised by
the phenomenon of private arbitrators adjudicating class actions.
The plurality only held that the arbitrator, not the court, should
decide the initial question of whether the contract, albeit silent,
permits or forbids class action arbitration."
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP, the National Asian Pacific American
Legal Consortium, the National Partnership for Women & Families, Women Employed, the
National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice filed
amicus briefs supporting respondent consumers. Corporate and free-market-oriented
organizations such as banking associations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Equal
Employment Advisory Council, DIRECTV, Inc., National Council of Chain Restaurants, New
England Legal Foundation, Verizon Wireless, and the Washington Legal Foundation filed
amicus briefs supporting Green Tree.
31. Green Tree argued the due process rights of absentee class members could only be
protected through individual arbitration. Transcript of Oral Argument at *15, *28-29, Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634), 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 38. Seemingly, corporate concern for due
process in class arbitration provides an argument to defeat the practice by separating
claimants and requiring the unlikely assertion of individual claims.
32. To avoid risks of ambiguity in interpretation and of class actions, more companies
have rewritten their contracts to contain explicit bans on class actions both in court and in
arbitration, raising another important question of whether arbitration contracts can be
written to eliminate class actions altogether. The courts are divided as to whether these
express bans on judicial or arbitral class actions are unconscionable by state law contract
standards and, therefore, unenforceable, or whether the FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration
agreements "as they are written" preempts state laws. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004,
at 75, 75-79; see also infra note 42.
33. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447. The Court split 4-1-3-1. Id. at 446. Four Justices concluded
that whether the contracts forbid class arbitration is a disputed issue of contract
interpretation and that it must be decided by an arbitrator. Id. at 453-54. Justice Stevens
concurred in the judgment, although he would have preferred to affirm the South Carolina
decision. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring). In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, concluded that a court should decide whether the arbitration
contract permitted class arbitration and that the FAA preempted the state law. Id. at 455-59
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion, reiterating
that the FAA does not apply in state court proceedings. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See also Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree
1720
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Following Bazzle, arbitrators are empowered to determine the
meaning of a silent or ambiguous arbitration provision and thus to
rule that class actions may be maintained in arbitration. 4 Although
the notion of class actions in arbitration appears, at first blush,
diametrically opposed-like universes colliding-the Court implic-
itly endorsed the concept. While indicating that class actions in
arbitration are permissible under the FAA,3  the Court offered little
guidance on how this process should be structured, what particular
standards or procedures apply, if any, and whether a public court
should maintain any level of involvement because of the represen-
tative nature of the actions.
The two different paths employed by the administrator toward
administering class arbitrations prior to the Court's Bazzle decision
illustrate the potential for the lack of uniformity, the ill-defined
roles for the court and the arbitrator, and the unclear due process
rights of absent members in a class arbitration.
The process of class arbitration raises important questions
requiring a legal determination of the requisite procedural
protections for nonparticpatory members in class arbitration. In a
judicial class action, the court is extensively involved throughout the
process. A fundamental precept of constitutional due process is that
a party cannot be bound by a judgment to which he or she was not
a party.36 An exception to this rule is a litigated class action, where
absent class members who have not opted out are bound by a class
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 18 (2004) (describing the effect of Bazzle and
contending that Bazzle failed to establish binding precedent on the class arbitrability issue).
34. After the Supreme Court's decision ordering the arbitrator to decide the question of
contract interpretation, the arbitrator ruled on remand that the contracts did not preclude
class arbitration and reinstated the awards. Scott L. Nelson, Bazzle, Class Actions, and
Arbitration: An Unfinished Story, 15 A.BA. SEC. LITIG. CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS
8 (2005). The presumption in favor of arbitration, as well as the economic self-interest of the
arbitrator, suggests that arbitrators are likely to construe such provisions similarly.
35. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe FAA does not prohibit
parties from choosing to proceed on a class-wide basis.").
36. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting that it is "our deep-rooted
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("It is a principle of general application
in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party
by service of process."); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725-26, 728-29 (1877) (stating that
judgments against nonresidents without personal service risk fraud and oppression).
2006l 1721
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judgment or settlement, provided that constitutional standards of
notice and adequate representation are satisfied. Notice and
adequacy of representation thus serve as a proxy for due process to
bind absent members in a judicial class action.37 Court rules set
forth an elaborate procedure designed to ensure due process. These
rules specifically entrust the presiding judge with the duty to ensure
compliance with these constitutional strictures.38 Class arbitration
lacks similar guarantees that nonparticipating members' rights will
be fairly protected.
How, then, should courts handle subsequent objections to arbitral
decisions by absent class members? An arbitral award generally
cannot bind a nonparty to the arbitration contract; however, the
question of whether nonparticipatory class members' rights may be
foreclosed in a private class arbitration is not entirely clear.39
The limited judicial scrutiny accorded arbitral awards raises a
critical question of whether members of a class arbitration are or
should be entitled to due process protections, and, if so, how that
may be assured in the private arbitral context. When government
action is involved in the adjudication of an individual's claim, the
U.S. Constitution requires due process of law.40 Arbitration is by
definition a process whereby parties have agreed to adjudicate
claims privately and thus to forgo the public judicial process.
Notwithstanding, do disputing parties, in particular nonparticipat-
ing members, also forgo methods and procedures created to protect
their constitutional rights? Presumably, an agreement to arbitrate
is not necessarily consent to forgo due process rights-"it merely
37. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40 (holding that a class member whose interests were not
adequately represented is not bound by the results of class adjudication).
38. See, for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and state counterparts. Federal
judicial decisions regarding certification are immediately appealable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
39. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
294 (2002) (ruling that the EEOC was not bound by an employee's arbitration obligation);
Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a
nonsignatory may be bound to arbitrate only under the theories of third-party beneficiary,
agency, or equitable estoppel); Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v. Custom
Air Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a nonsignatory may be bound to an
arbitration agreement under five limited theories: incorporation by reference, assumption,
agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and estoppel).
40. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
1722 [Vol. 47:1711
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provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of such rights.""
Accordingly, do the basic due process protections that apply in a
judicial class action, such as the protective role of the court and
provisions for certification, notice, and adequate representation,
apply equally in class arbitration?
No statute, state or federal, prescribes the rules or procedures for
class arbitrations to ensure that the process is uniform, fair, or
efficient. Moreover, whether any level of court involvement is
required-or even permissible-is an open question. The FAA calls
for judicial involvement to enforce arbitration agreements and
awards; it does not address the judicial role in the class arbitral
setting. Yet may or must courts be involved in arbitral class actions?
Where courts are sought to participate in aspects of arbitral class
actions, does such selective judicial involvement in the class
arbitration process trigger constitutional protections? Specifically,
does the court's role in assisting the arbitrator in administering
aspects of the arbitral class proceeding mean that there is now state
action in class arbitration? If so, does class arbitration have to
satisfy requirements whereby absent members are entitled to a
similar level of due process or judicial oversight? Are there due
process or other constitutional, policy, or simply practical consider-
ations for ensuring that a public judge, rather than a private
arbitrator, conducts certain aspects of a class action, even in
arbitration? Or may the entire process be conducted in private? May
a class arbitration process avoid due process scrutiny altogether by
intentionally eschewing any court involvement?
Boldly assuming the strike of a pen via an express ban on arbitral
class actions cannot be used to eviscerate class action recourse
altogether,"2 this Article focuses on the process of class arbitration
41. Choice v. Option One Mortgage Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-6626, 2003 WL 22097455, at *8
(E.D. Pa. May 13, 2003) (order granting motion to stay arbitration).
42. Courts are divided on the validity of class action waivers in arbitration agreements.
See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
an employee contract barring arbitral class actions is "patently one-sided" and
unconscionable); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 & n.21 (S.C. 2002)
(stating that interpreting contract silence as a ban on class actions in arbitration allows the
drafting party to "effectively prevent class actions against it without having to say it was
doing so in the agreement," and that an express ban on classwide arbitrations "undermines
principles favoring expeditious and equitable case disposition absent demonstrated prejudice
to the drafter of the adhesive contract"), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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itself, exploring the role of the court in the varied approaches to
administering class arbitration, as well as the constitutional, policy,
and practical implications of arbitral class actions.43 Part I provides
an overview ofjudicial class actions, noting in particular the critical
role accorded to the court in protecting the rights of unnamed
parties. It also compares the varied approaches to administering
classwide arbitration in California, under the AAA rules, and the
"court-free" approach, as used in Lackey.
Part II analyzes the constitutional implications of class arbitra-
tions by first exploring the arguments for whether state action
exists in participatory arbitration. Although acknowledging the
tepid judicial reception to constitutional claims due to limited state
action in participatory arbitration, this Part asserts that the distinct
characteristics of class arbitration present a strong case for finding
state action and for ensuring due process protections for nonpartici-
pating parties.
Under a successful ban on arbitral class actions, parties with nominal individual claims,
but significant collective claims, would be left with no avenue for relief, and the drafting
party, with no check on its abuses of the law. See Sterlight & Jensen, supra note 32, at 77-92
(recounting courts' use of unconscionability to strike down express bans on arbitral class
actions and proposing, as a matter of policy, that Congress prohibit companies from using
arbitration clauses to preclude class actions). But cf Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that class action waivers are
not unconscionable when the state's unfair trade practices law does not permit judicial class
actions but allows the state attorney general to sue on behalf of the state or consumers);
Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
class action waivers are not unconscionable when the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees
exists).
The Reporter's notes to a draft of section ten of the recently revised Uniform Arbitration
Act indicate that to protect consumers' rights, a court may appropriately refuse to enforce an
express ban on arbitral class actions if the relative cost of arbitrating or securing legal
representation is cost prohibitive. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 10 cmt. 3, 1 4 (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 2000) (citing Christopher R. Drahozal, Unfair Arbitration Clauses 41 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, later published at 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695)). The final comments
omitted this statement, however, stating that " [slection 10 is not intended to address the issue
as to the validity of arbitration clauses in the context of class-wide disputes." UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 10 cmt. 3, 3 (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
uarba/arbitrat 1213.pdf.
43. A specific focus is whether due process must be accorded to class members in this
typically private adjudicatory process in which a judge approves or makes initial decisions
regarding certification, notice, and fairness yet otherwise delegates substantive adjudication
matters to a private arbitrator, or whether due process standards apply under an approach
where the arbitrator conducts all aspects of the class arbitration.
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In positing due process principles applicable in class arbitration,
as a matter of law or practical necessity, Part III identifies
minimal procedural protections necessary in classwide arbitration
and considers the respective roles of the court and the arbitrator.
This Article concludes that the legislative rules, such as Rule 23,
which require significant and ongoing judicial supervision of all
aspects of the class action, including approval of class certification
and settlements, are rooted in important constitutional protections.
The risk that arbitral class actions may proceed with no proce-
dural assurances impermissibly threatens notions of fundamental
fairness. Therefore, complete delegation of such important functions
to a private arbitral forum is improper. Selective use of the judicial
system, through the hybrid approaches, meaningfully invokes the
state and triggers due process obligations. Although the hybrid
approaches may appear inefficient because of court involvement,
these approaches better balance the arbitration obligation with the
need to ensure at least minimal process options for affected parties.
More problematic, however, is the completely "court- free" approach.
By eschewing court involvement, this approach potentially elimi-
nates any obligation to provide procedural protections for absent
class members. By law or necessity, the unique characteristics of
class arbitration mandate a minimal level of judicial procedural
protection. This Article proposes that such protection be codified by
federal law or broader individual state constitutional or statutory
due process protections.
I. REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION: JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL CLASS
ACTIONS
The standards and process for maintaining a judicial class action
are expressly set forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, state counterparts, and an extensive body of case law. It
is established that the court plays a significant role in the manage-
ment and adjudication of a judicial class action, with an overriding
purpose of protecting the rights of absent class members. In an
arbitral class action, the roles of the court, arbitrator, and class
representatives, and the rights of unnamed class members, are
undefined and left to an ad hoc determination by the arbitrator or
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provider. Even a single arbitrator may follow a different procedure.
For example, the same arbitrator served in both Bazzle and Lackey,
yet the court certified the Bazzle class while the arbitrator certified
the Lackey class." In order to assess the adequacy of the current
scheme for protecting the rights of nonparticipatory class arbitrants,
or lack thereof, this Part first examines the underlying policies and
procedural protections prescribed for judicial class actions, and then
contrasts the various approaches used in arbitral class actions.
A. Judicial Class Actions and Rule 23
A class action is a procedural joinder device that permits one or
more persons to initiate a lawsuit as a representative of all those
similarly situated. Prior consent or organization from other
members is not required. Class action lawsuits have certainly
generated criticism, deemed at times lawyer-driven or a form of
"legalized blackmail."" Yet, this procedural device is also considered
a "powerful and pervasive instrument[] of social change." 6 The
purpose behind the class suit is to enable redress for large-scale yet
"negative value" claims, such as those that are widespread but too
small in value to litigate individually and which therefore must
44. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 449 (2003).
45. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
784-85 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996)
(calling class actions "judicial blackmail" when they create "insurmountable pressure" on
defendants to settle); ABA Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 198-99 (1986) (acknowledging that
"[c]ries of 'legalized blackmail' ... while not infrequently overstated, reflect important
concerns").
46. KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 2, at 1.
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proceed as a class action or not at all.47 As earlier commentators on
class actions noted:
Modem society seems increasingly to expose men to such group
injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek
legal redress, either because they do not know enough or
because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is
left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at
best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any
at all. This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case,
but it will operate seriously to impair the deterrent effect of the
sanctions which underlie much contemporary law."
Throughout all stages of a judicial class action, the court is charged
with critical responsibilities for administering and presiding over
the proceeding.49 Because the effect of a class action judgment or
settlement is to resolve the rights of all members of the class and
thus to foreclose further remedy for class members, absent members
of the class are entitled to constitutional protection under the Due
47. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948) ([Mhe class
action was an invention of equity mothered by the practical necessity of providing a
procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united
in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their
equitable wrongs." (citation omitted)). English common law courts recognized the importance
of and provided for a form of class action when related interests were involved. The English
Court of Chancery enacted the "bill of peace," which enabled a court of equity to hear cases
brought by or against representatives of a group if it met certain requirements. See 7A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005). The
English bill of peace evolved into the modern American class action. Id.; see also Shaw v.
Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (providing a brief history
of the class action in the United States and concluding l[ilt is now apparent that the
increasing complexity and urbanization of modern American society has tremendously
magnified the importance of the class action as a procedural device for resolving disputes
affecting numerous people" (quoting 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALVA CONTE, NEWBERG ON
CLASS AcTIoNS § 1.09 (3d ed. 1992))).
48. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 686 (1941).
49. See Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
because of the danger class counsel might tacitly collude with the defendants, the Federal
Rules require judicial oversight of class action settlements and attorneys' fees); Shaw, 91 F.
Supp. 2d at 951 (stating that "class actions are complex mechanisms that require exceptional
lawyers and considerable judicial oversight"); ABA Section of Litig., supra note 45, at 199
(quelling Rule 23 criticism by ensuring such concerns are mitigated "by judicial oversight and
discerning application of procedural mechanisms already in place and designed to eliminate
... abuses of the litigation process").
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Process Clause. This protection includes, at a minimum: notice, a
meaningful opportunity to participate, and adequate representa-
tion.5" Rule 23 provisions reflect these constitutional requirements,
and the court's role is critical in safeguarding the due process rights
of absent class members.5' The court is charged with certifying the
class, determining adequacy of representation, overseeing notice,
managing the class action, and determining the fairness of any
settlement of the claim.52 In other words, significant judicial
involvement in a class action serves the function of protecting
absent class members' rights.
1. Certification "Death Knell" and Adequacy of Representation
Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), a court must determine whether to
grant or deny class certification "at an early practicable time" after
the commencement of the action.53 The court's decision is critical in
the adjudication process for it often affects whether the case
proceeds. This decision has been described as the "death knell" of a
litigation because denial of class status may cause individual
plaintiffs to abandon small yet widespread claims, while certifica-
tion may create extreme pressure on defendants to settle.54
50. See Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (holding that "[tihe core of due
process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard"); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32,44 (1940) (holding that due process requires named class representatives to have
"identical" interests to those of absent class members "so that any group who had elected to
enforce rights conferred by the agreement could be said to be acting in the interest of any
others who were free to deny its obligation").
51. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that if the
forum state wishes to bind an absent class member, "it must provide minimal procedural due
process protection"); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45 (holding that absent parties would not be
bound by a judgment unless the substantial interests of the selected representatives are the
same as those whom they are deemed to represent); cf Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 175-76 (1974) (holding that an "unambiguous requirement" of Rule 23 is that "individual
notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable through reasonable
effort").
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)-(e), (g).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
54. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 & n.2 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting the effective "death knell" impact of the certification decision provided the
rationale for adding Rule 23(f), permitting interlocutory review of certification decisions in
judicial class actions).
The ripple effect of the certification decision also encompasses other important issues, such
as the structure and stakes of the litigation, the identity of parties, the conduct of discovery,
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In this certification ruling, the court determines whether the
prerequisites for a judicial class action are satisfied as set forth in
Rule 23. Specifically, the court determines whether
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.55
The court's responsibility to determine that both the lawyer and the
representative parties adequately represent the class is rooted in
safeguarding the due process rights of absent class members.56
Judgments in a class action are an exception to the general rule that
one cannot be bound by a judgment to which he or she was not
designated as a party.57 A class judgment binds all members of the
class who have not opted out as long as the party's interests and
rights were adequately represented in the proceedings.5" Thus,
adequacy of representation is a proxy for absent members' due
process.
When a class satisfies these prerequisites, the court must
designate the class under one of three categories in Rule 23(b). Rule
23(b)(1) provides for class designation when separate actions risk
establishing inconsistent decisions and incompatible standards of
conduct for defendants or impairing the interests of class members
who are not parties to the lawsuit.59 Rule 23(b)(2) operates when
plaintiffs seek primarily injunctive or declaratory relief,6 ° such as in
the procedure for motion practice, the application of alternative dispute resolution procedures,
and the approach to settlement negotiations. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGAnON (THIRD)
§ 30.1 (1995).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
56. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45.
57. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877) (discussing the general rule that in
personam judgments are void unless service of process is provided).
58. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42-43.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Examples of classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) include
"limited fund" situations where numerous claimants seek to collect on claims that exceed
insurance coverage and citizen suits against a municipality to issue or not issue bonds.
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing a class action if "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
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civil rights cases.6 Most suits fall under Rule 23(b)(3), where
plaintiffs primarily seek monetary damages and "the court finds
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any question affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."62
2. Notice
Notice and the opportunity to be heard are fundamental to the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process.6' The manner of
notice is also important; for example, mere publication is generally
insufficient. Rule 23 incorporates the constitutional notice standard
and specifically requires the court to direct individual notice to class
members in all cases seeking primarily monetary relief.' The notice
must advise each member (1) of the nature of the action, including
claims, issues, or defenses; (2) of the definition of the certified class;
(3) of the opportunity to "opt out" and the binding effect of exercising
this option; and (4) that the class member has the option of entering
an appearance through counsel.65 The Supreme Court has held that
the representative plaintiff must initially pay for such notice, even
when the cost of providing individual notice is prohibitively high
and the inability to bear the costs would end the suit.
6
as a whole").
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 amendments).
62. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3). Small claims and mass tort actions are examples of typical
23(b)(3) classes.
63. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) ("[Tihe court must direct to the class members the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort."); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (stating that
notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections").
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
66. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1974) ("There is nothing in
Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of
particular plaintiffs.").
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3. Judicial Oversight, Management, and "Fairness" Decisions
The court plays an active and substantive role in all stages of a
judicial class action. 7 Rule 23 directs the presiding court to oversee
and manage class action proceedings "for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action."' Judicial involvement in class action lawsuits ranges from
providing minimal guidance to more extensive and hands-on
participation. These tasks may include the judge taking initiative
in shaping the suit, establishing strict timelines for litigation,
working with magistrates, devising expert panels to facilitate
discovery, directing pretrial scheduling, and engaging in fact-
finding, while promoting settlement throughout the process.69
Unlike individual party litigation, which may be settled without
judicial approval, judges are responsible for scrutinizing the
"fairness" of a class settlement.7" The intricate role of the court in
judicial class actions is rooted in protecting the due process rights
of all class members. These codified guidelines and an extensive
arsenal of case precedent equip judges and parties to deal with the
complexities inherent in class action lawsuits, to avoid abuse or
collusion, and thus to protect the interests of every class member.71
67. See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION (THIRD) § 20.13 (1995) (describing effective
judicial management responsibilities).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
69. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2012-33 (1997) (describing
Judge Weinstein's involvement in managing class actions as an example of how influential
and controlling the court may be in class action litigation).
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
71. Another method of protecting litigants' rights in the court system is the availability
of appellate review. Parties have two options for appeal: interlocutory appellate review and
appeal from a final judgment. Parties have three options for invoking interlocutory appellate
review: Rule 23(f) (appeals from orders on class certification), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000)
(interlocutory appeals), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) (petitions for mandamus). These three
methods of appeal allow parties, upon approval of the appellate court, to request review of the
district judge's application of Rule 23. The availability of immediate review of important class
action decisions serves as another method of safeguarding the rights and interests of the
parties involved. Interlocutory appeals are granted upon the discretion of the court of appeals.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2002). Even if this request for immediate review is denied, dissatisfied
parties still have an opportunity to be heard by appealing the final judgment. Courts are
divided as to whether unnamed individual class members (who have not intervened) can seek
appeal. See Shults v. Champion Intl Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1059-61 (6th Cir. 1994).
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B. Arbitral Class Actions
A classwide arbitration may proceed by party consent, pursuant
to an arbitrator's ruling that the contract permits such a proceeding,
or by judicial enforcement of the arbitrator's determination.72 But
how a class arbitration is to be conducted, in particular the respec-
tive roles of the court and arbitrator, or the application and
interplay between traditional procedural requirements for class
actions regarding class certification, notice, or settlement approval,
is not defined in the FAA or by statute and is largely left to the ad
hoc determination of the arbitrator or provider.73 The relationship
between the arbitrator and the trial judge is not defined and can
vary on a case-by-case basis, as exemplified in the contrasting
approaches taken by the same arbitrator in Bazzle and Lackey.74 In
both cases, however, the court played a supervisory role-including
hearing the claims initially, appointing an arbitrator, and confirm-
ing the settlement award.7" Interestingly, the Supreme Court did
not comment on the different approaches to class certification-by
a court in Bazzle, by an arbitrator in Lackey-or on the differences
in overseeing notice and issuing a final award.7" The Court neither
72. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (requiring judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate);
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003) ("Under the terms of the parties'
contracts, the question-whether the agreement forbids class arbitration-is for the arbitrator
to decide.").
73. Neither the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000), nor the Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A.
§§ 1-25 (1997), sets forth the procedures to be followed in an arbitration, let alone a class
arbitration. See Jean R. Sternlight,As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 16 (2000). Although parties have
autonomy to design arbitration procedures by express agreement, arbitration contracts
typically incorporate the procedural rules of a provider organization. Absent express rules
governing the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator has broad discretion to manage the
arbitration process. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 15(a) (providing for arbitral discretion to
manage the arbitration process); id. cmt. 1 (noting the provision is subject to the parties'
agreement); DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 29:7 (West 3d ed. 2003) ("The form of the
arbitration proceedings depends essentially upon the agreement of the parties .... [tihe parties
have good reason to refer to the arbitration rules of an administering agency which will
provide for the proper conduct of the proceedings."); see also Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel
Prods. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1999) (unless agreed to by the parties, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in proceedings held by an arbitrator). Because arbitral
proceedings are conducted in private, there is no public record of the arbitral proceedings.
74. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449; see supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
75. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449.
76. See id. at 449-50.
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addressed the question of whether a court must have some involve-
ment in private arbitral class actions nor provided any guidance on
the process.
1. Assumptions that Class Arbitration Should Mirror Judicial
Class Actions
Class arbitration is not an entirely new phenomenon; it has been
used in California since the early 1980s. Uniform rules for its
administration have not been promulgated, however. In Keating v.
Superior Court, the California Supreme Court was one of the first
courts to contemplate class arbitration as a procedure that could
give effect both to the parties' obligation to arbitrate disputes per an
adhesion contract and also to effectuate the policies for collective
action.7" Acknowledging the novelty of ordering the parties to such
a procedure, the court reasoned that a judge must maintain a
critical role in classwide arbitration, stating that "[w] ithout a doubt
a judicially ordered classwide arbitration would entail a greater
degree of judicial involvement than is normally associated with
arbitration, ideally a complete proceeding, without resort to court
facilities."7" Keating identified a continued role for the trial court in
classwide arbitration:
77. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed the class action brought in state court and held that the plaintiffs claims were
subject to arbitration under the FAA, which preempted a state law requiring judicial
resolution of state law claims asserted in a class action by franchisees against a franchisor.
Keating, 465 U.S. at 16-17. The Court did not discuss class arbitration or the California
Supreme Court's comments on the process, yet it implicitly acknowledged that class actions
could be brought in arbitration. See id. at 7-9. The Keating holding has resulted in increased
permission of arbitral class actions.
78. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that
[i]f the alternative in a case of this sort is to force hundreds of individual
[parties] each to litigate its cause ... in a separate arbitral forum, then the
prospect of classwide arbitration, for all its difficulties, may offer a better, more
efficient, and fairer solution. Where that is so, and gross unfairness would result
from the denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis, then an order
structuring arbitration on that basis would be justified.
Id.; see also Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002) (permitting
classwide arbitration on independent state grounds), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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The court would have to make initial determinations regarding
certification and notice to the class, and if classwide arbitration
proceeds it may be called upon to exercise a measure of external
supervision in order to safeguard the rights of absent class
members to adequate representation and in the event of dis-
missal or settlement. A good deal of care, and ingenuity, would
be required to avoid judicial intrusion upon the merits of the
dispute, or upon the conduct of the proceedings themselves and
to minimize complexity, costs, or delay.79
Other courts have made similar statements, concluding generally
that a court must certify the class, ensure that proper notice is
provided, approve any proposed settlement, handle possible
conflicts, and even oversee discovery.8 ° The few judicial decisions
contemplating arbitral class proceedings have assumed a continuing
judicial role in class arbitration to monitor the due process rights of
the class throughout the arbitration procedure, yet they rarely
articulate that such a role is required by specific federal or state
law. One state appellate court averred, "A court must supervise a
classwide arbitration in order to safeguard the rights of absent class
members to adequate representation and in the event of dismissal
or settlement."8 ' The plurality in Bazzle, however, held that the
arbitrator, not the court, should decide whether a case may proceed
as a class action.82 The logical extension of the Court's reasoning is
that a court's only role in class action arbitrations is determining
79. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); Sternlight, supra note 73, at 40-42. Professor Sternlight obtained information
regarding the role of the courts in hybrid arbitral class actions by conducting interviews with
attorneys who participated in the proceedings. Id. at 40 n.148. She found that
[i]n every class action arbitration as to which [she] was able to obtain
information, it was the court that decided whether the matter could proceed as
a class action, defined the class, and approved the notice to the class. In the
instances in which the suits settled, the court approved the settlement. In
several cases, the court assumed even more responsibilities, such as resolving
all discovery issues and motions leading up to the point of trial.
Id. at 40-42 (footnotes omitted).
81. Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Izzi court noted that public policy favors both class actions and
arbitrations as "valuable procedures for expediting dispute resolution and ameliorating the
burdens of formal litigation." Id. at 320.
82. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453-54 (2003).
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whether the parties have formed a valid contract, leaving all other
issues, including further contract interpretation, class certification,
and case management and adjudication to the arbitrator.8
2. Approaches to Administering Arbitral Class Actions
Although there is no uniform procedure for class arbitrations, the
following three approaches have been advanced. Currently, three
varied approaches are used: First, California courts have endorsed
a hybrid court-administration approach whereby a court retains
responsibility for certification, notice, and fairness approval, while
a private arbitrator adjudicates the merits of the class case.'
Second, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) has adopted a
modified hybrid approach in its Supplementary Rules for Class
Administration, promulgated in response to the Bazzle decision.85
These rules incorporate many of the standards under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 and appear to provide for substantial interac-
tion between the courts and the arbitrator. For example, the AAA
rules provide parties the option to seek judicial confirmation of
arbitral rulings on class certification, notice, and settlement
83. See, e.g., Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343
F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's certification of a class for
arbitration because the arbitrators were to decide whether class arbitration was available or
forbidden); In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. 2004) (holding that an arbitrator, not a
court, should rule on class certification issues when the contracts at issue committed all
disputes arising out of the agreement to the arbitrator); see also Carole J. Buckner, Toward
a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption,
82 DENY. U. L. REv. 301,304, 353-54 (2004) (contending that Bazzle and the expansive scope
of federal arbitration law has effectively discredited the hybrid model ["no longer legally
viable"] and requires full arbitral involvement in all aspects of the class arbitration as in the
pure arbitral approached used in Lackey).
84. Since Keating, California, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina have permitted class
arbitrations. See Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779,785 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) ("Under California decisional authority, class wide arbitration is permissible."); Dickler,
596 A.2d at 867 (holding that "[flairness mandates ... that the Dickler Group, bound by
adhesion form contracts to arbitration agreements, be able to protect their interests by
proceeding as a class through arbitration"); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349,
360-61 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
85. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SuPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 4-6, 8, available at
httpJ/www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936; see also Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Policy on Class
Arbitration (July 14, 2005) [hereinafter AAA Class Policy], available at http'J/www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967 (describing AAA's policy of not administering class arbitrations
without a court order when the enforcing contract expressly bans arbitral class actions).
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approval.86 Third, an alternative approach to class arbitration
administration, like that used in the Lackey arbitration, is essen-
tially "court free," where the arbitrator administers all aspects of
the class arbitration. s7
a. The California Hybrid Judicial-Administration Model
California has recognized the classwide arbitration procedure
since the state supreme court's decision in Keating v. Superior
Court."s Class arbitrations in California have operated under a
hybrid process in which the judge continues to conduct key aspects
of the class action reflected in Rule 23. In this hybrid "judicial-
administration" model, the court determines initial class certifica-
tion, adequacy of representation, and proper notice to all class
members, and reviews any settlement or dismissal of the action.
Other courts ordering classwide arbitration have followed a similar
hybrid process, retaining jurisdiction to determine certification and
notice while leaving determination of the merits to the arbitration
panel.89
86. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 12 (stating that the
AAA will comply with any court order directed to the parties or the conduct of the arbitration).
87. In February 2005, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS)
announced its class action procedures, which provide for no judicial oversight of class
arbitration. See JAMS, CLASS AcTION P., available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/class-
action.asp.
88. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980),
overruled by 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d
860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (ordering trial court to make initial class certification
determination, ensure proper notice, review any proposed class settlement, and to supervise
any potential conflicts among the class representatives concerning the selection of
arbitrators); see also Mullenix, supra note 4 ("When courts have ordered classwide arbitration
... the courts have retained responsibility for deciding all major class action decisions. Hence
classwide arbitrations resemble a 'hybrid' amalgam procedure of class action requirements
and arbitration techniques."); Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration and 10b-5
Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELLL. REV. 380,
403-05 (1989) (advocating initial court certification of an arbitral class then sending case to
arbitration); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67
VA. L. REV. 787,814 (1981).
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b. The AAA Option for Judicial Confirmation Approach
Following the Bazzle decision, the AAA released its Supplemen-
tary Rules concerning class arbitrations. 9° The AAA is the first of
few providers to attempt to set forth guidelines in administering
arbitral class actions. The AAA has structured a modified hybrid
process for administering class arbitrations, whereby the arbitrator
is responsible for all aspects of the class arbitration but parties have
the option to seek judicial review of arbitral decisions regarding
clause construction and class certification." The AAA policy states
that it will not administer class arbitration where the underlying
agreement prohibits class claims, consolidation, or joinder, unless
the parties are under a court order.92 The AAA will administer class
arbitration where the parties' agreement provides for arbitration
and either expressly permits or is silent with respect to class
claims.93 Unlike most arbitrations, which are confidential, the rules
also provide for public disclosure of class arbitration hearings and
filings.94 The AAA also maintains a case docket on its website that
details key information about the case.95
The AAA policy essentially sets forth a three-step process. In step
one, the arbitrator makes the initial determination, in accordance
with Bazzle, of whether the arbitration clause permits a class action
and enters a "Clause Construction Award."9 The rules then provide
for a thirty-day stay of arbitral proceedings to permit either party
to seek judicial relief to confirm or vacate the Clause Construction
90. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSN SuPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 1-12.
91. Id.
92. AAA Class Policy, supra note 85. Initially, JAMS also refused to administer contracts
that expressly banned class actions, but it reversed this policy in response to criticism by
corporate clients. See Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality
Through Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration Waiver Policy (Mar. 10, 2005), available at
http'/www.jamsadr.com/press/showrelease.aspid=198.
93. AAA Class Policy, supra note 85, at Rule 9(a) (noting that it made the decision in
response to the Bazzle decision).
94. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SuPp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 9(a) ("The presumption of
privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not apply in class arbitrations.").
95. AM. ARBITRATION ASSN SuPp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 9(b). The class arbitration
docket will contain "(1) a copy of the demand for arbitration; (2) the identities of the parties;
(3) the names and contact information of counsel for each party; (4) a list of awards made in
the arbitration by the arbitrator; and (5) the date, time and place of any scheduled hearings."
96. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N Supp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 3.
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Award. 7 Once this time period has run without a challenge to the
award, or once a challenge has been denied by the court, the
arbitrator proceeds with the class action arbitration."
In step two, the arbitrator determines whether to certify the
proposed class. In contrast to the California model in which a public
judge certifies the class, under the AAA rules, the arbitrator is the
sole certifying authority. In this assessment, the arbitrator is to
follow criteria that parallel Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for numerosity, commonality of questions of law and fact,
typicality of representative claims, and adequacy of representa-
tion.99 The AAA rules add a requirement that the arbitrator find
"each class member has entered into an agreement containing an
arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that signed by
the class representative(s) and each of the other class members." 00
The arbitrator also determines whether class arbitration is manage-
able and maintainable by investigating whether questions of law or
fact common to the class predominate over any questions facing
individual members.' Upon deciding whether a class can be
maintained in arbitration, the arbitrator submits what is known as
the "Class Determination Award."0 2 An award certifying a class
arbitration must "define the class, identify the class representa-
tive(s) and counsel, and shall set forth the class claims, issues, or
defenses," in addition to stating "when and how members of the
class may be excluded from the class arbitration." 3 Again, the AAA
rules provide for a thirty-day stay of all proceedings following the
issuance of the Class Determination Award to permit any party to
seek judicial review to confirm or vacate the Class Determination
Award. l 4
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 4(a)(I)-(5) (mirroring FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a)).
100. AM. ARBITRATION ASSN SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 4(a)(6).
101. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N Supp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 4(b) (mirroring FED. R. CIv.
P. 23(b)(3)).
102. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N Supp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 5(a).
103. AM. ARBITRATION ASSN SuPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 5(b)-(c) (mirroring FED. R.
CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(B)).
104. AM. ARBITRATION ASS*N SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 5(d).
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After certification, the arbitrator issues a "Notice of Class
Determination," which directs that class members be provided the
"best notice practicable under the circumstances."" 5 This notice is
required for "all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort"0 6 and must describe
(1) the nature of the action; (2) the definition of the class
certified; (3) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (4) that a class
member may enter an appearance through counsel if the
member so desires, and that any class member may attend the
hearings; (5) that the arbitrator will exclude from the class any
member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members
may elect to be excluded; (6) the binding effect of a class judg-
ment on class members; (7) the identity and biographical
information about the arbitrator, the class representative(s) and
class counsel that have been approved by the arbitrator to
represent the class; and (8) how and to whom a class member
may communicate about the class arbitration, including infor-
mation about the AAA Class Arbitration Docket ....
Following notice, the class action arbitration proceeds to the
"trial-type" stage where the arbitrator hears the evidence and
arguments of both parties. The arbitrator then renders a "Final
Award" on the merits that "shall be reasoned and shall define the
class with specificity."0 8 The arbitrator must approve any settle-
ment, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of arbitral class claims
and conduct a hearing to determine the fairness of such
disposition.0 9 The arbitrator also rules on requests for exclusion and
objections to settlement."0 Presumably, then, all class members who
have not opted out are bound by the class arbitration ruling.
105. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N SupP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 6(a).
106. Id.
107. AM. ARBITRATION ASS N SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 6(b) (mirroring FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)).
108. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SUPP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 7.
109. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N Supp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 8.
110. See AM. ARBITRATION AssN Supp. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 8(c) ("The arbitrator
may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion
to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not
do so."); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASs'N SupP. R. FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 8(d) ("Any class
member may object to a proposed settlement ... that requires approval .... Such an objection
may be withdrawn only with the approval of the arbitrator.").
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The AAA does not purport to ensure that the constitutional or
substantive rights of the parties involved will be upheld. Neither
does it maintain that justice will be carried out. Yet, the AAA rules
do reflect consideration for the implicit due process concerns of
nonparticipating class members."'
c. Lackey Style: Arbitrator Does It All/No Judicial
Involvement
Another approach to administering class arbitration is to simply
have no judicial involvement, as in Lackey, where the arbitrator
conducted all aspects of the arbitration, including certification,
notice, and final award."2 A completely "court-free" approach is
perhaps most consistent with generally conceived notions of private
arbitration. And even though the Supreme Court did not address
the propriety of a complete, privately conducted class arbitration,
practical and policy concerns compel thought on the wisdom of
entrusting arbitrators with protecting all class members, consider-
ing varying levels of arbitral expertise, a complicated procedural
process, and the lack of judicial supervision or opportunity for
meaningful appeal. For example, the court-free approach may be
construed as a desirable means to avoid judicial scrutiny and
accountability for providing procedural fairness in class arbitration
altogether. JAMS, the nation's largest for-profit provider of
alternative dispute resolution, promulgated procedures that require
the arbitrator to conduct all aspects of the class proceedings and to
determine clause construction and class certification as partial final
awards subject to immediate court review."' The JAMS class rules
also require the arbitrator to approve any settlement of class claims
as well as to direct notice to affected class members, but, unlike the
AAA class rules, do not provide for judicial review." 4
111. The AAA rules were evaluated and supported by the court in Bess v. DirecTV, Inc., 815
N.E.2d 455 (ll. App. Ct. 2004), which followed Bazzle and held that the arbitrator must decide
whether "the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of...
a class" and "whether class arbitration is the best method to resolve the case." Bess, 815
N.E.2d at 460 (omission in original) (citations omitted).
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. JAMS R. CLASS ACTION P. 2-3.
114. JAMS R. CLASS ACTION P. 2-6.
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3. Analysis of the Various Approaches
The court in a judicial class action is entrusted with protecting
the due process rights of absent class members, as well as ensuring
the fundamental fairness of the class proceeding and its ultimate
disposition. Both the California judicial-administration model and
the AAA option for judicial confirmation of class procedural rulings
reflect an implicit recognition for absent members' procedural
protections by some mechanism for continued judicial oversight. Yet
neither has acknowledged explicitly that judicial involvement in
class arbitration is required or even permitted by a particular
constitutional, statutory, or common law authority.'15 As a practical
matter, the hybrid approaches represent the worst of both systems.
In Keating, Justice Richardson critiqued the hybrid procedure as
cumbersome and "fundamentally contrary to the purpose of
arbitration and to the public policy encouraging arbitration."" 6 He
noted that arbitrators are often not legally trained and do not write
opinions and that the rules of evidence and procedure are inapplica-
ble." 7 As a result, meaningful judicial review is unavailable."'
When the court handles all of these aspects of the class claim, it
raises questions as to what is left for the arbitrator and whether the
extensive involvement of the court defeats the goal of efficiency in
arbitral class actions." 9 Indeed, the coordination between the judge
and the arbitrator in a hybrid approach seems unwieldy and
confusing.
Another concern is the propriety of this selective use of the
judicial system. 20 For example, how can federal courts assume
jurisdiction of a case for purposes of Rule 23 and supervise aspects
of the class action, including notice and certification, and then send
115. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Kan.
2005) (holding that the district court lacked authority to interfere with arbitration
proceedings to make interlocutory rulings regarding case manager's (AAA) decision to process
case as a class arbitration; allowing court review only upon final arbitral award), affd sub
nom. In re Universal Serv. Fund. Tel. Billing Practice Litig. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 428 F.3d
940 (10th Cir. 2005).
116. Keatingv. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1217 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting
in part), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
117. Id. at 1215.
118. See id. at 1215-18.
119. See id. at 1217-18.
120. See infra Part III.
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the case to a private, binding arbitral forum? The provisions of Rule
23 requirejudicial approval of class settlements and public notice as
well as ongoing judicial supervision of all aspects of the class action;
yet the hybrid approaches delegate important decisions in the case,
including the underlying trial and determination on the merits, to
a private arbitral forum. On the other hand, the "court-free"
approach is perhaps even more problematic, by eliminating any
court involvement and accountability for process integrity and
fairness for all class members.
Under either approach, parties may seek judicial enforcement of
class arbitral awards. Does this ultimate option for judicial enforce-
ment obligate the court or legislature, which provides for judicial
enforcement through the FAA, to ensure the class award is a
product of fundamental fairness? The following Part examines
whether class arbitration, under either the hybrid or judge-free
approach, must comport with constitutional standards for due
process.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARBITRAL CLASS ACTIONS
A. Due Process and Arbitration: Are Class Arbitrants Entitled to
Due Process?
Constitutional guarantees apply to litigants in state and federal
courts and in situations where "state action" is involved, but not to
the activities of private actors. 2' Although a "representative" form
of litigation, judicial class actions must provide all class members
due process of law.'22 In class actions seeking monetary damages,
this process is met through the notice, opportunity for a hearing,
121. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,620 (1991) ("Although the
conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances,
governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must
be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to
constitutional constraints."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,13 (1948) ("Mhe action inhibited
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to
be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however ... wrongful."); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("The wrongful act of an
individual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual.").
122. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
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and adequacy of representation requirements, which are overseen
by the court. A variety of other protections enumerated in proce-
dure, evidentiary, trial, and appellate codes also apply in judicial
proceedings.
By contrast, parties in arbitration are deemed to have waived
rights to ajudicial forum and presumably some, but not necessarily
all, attendant procedural protections. 12 3 In theory, the arbitration
process is as agreed to by the parties. As a practical matter, parties
submit to the notion of arbitration incident to a primary transaction
and in advance of a dispute, which they presumably expect not to
occur or else they would not enter the transaction. The details of
what that arbitration process will entail are not generally agreed to
in advance, and then are subject to the varied practice of the
arbitrator or provider organization.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are applicable to federal
and state governments, respectively, and provide that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."24 A cause of action is a species of property within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause.'25 The FAA permits a party
to seek judicial confirmation of an arbitral award in the form of a
judgment, which then "may be enforced as if it had been rendered
in an action in the court in which it is entered."'26 Although a court
may vacate or modify awards under specific circumstances,' 27 it does
not review the merits of the underlying award or whether due
123. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,94-
96 (1972) (detailing issues relevant in determining whether due process rights have been
waived); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also id. amend V.
125. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
126. 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
127. The grounds for vacating an arbitral decision are extremely limited. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(1)-(4) (2000) (authorizingjudges to vacate an arbitral award if "procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means;" or there is "evident partiality or corruption;" or "misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing ... or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced;" or when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made");
9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000) (authorizing judges to modify an arbitral award for "evident material
miscalculation of figures"); see also Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights,
71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 112-16 (1992) (recognizing that FAA provisions for vacatur of awards
procured by undue means and arbitral bias provide a modicum of process protections).
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process was accorded to parties in the arbitration. Interestingly,
that an award did not comport with due process is not grounds
for vacatur under the FAA. By contrast, an international or
nondomestic arbitral award not in compliance with due process is
a ground for declining enforcement under the New York
Convention. 2 ' Thus, an award in a class arbitration may be
enforced as a judgment and the rights of all class members fore-
closed by doctrines of claim preclusion or res judicata.'29
A question of increasing concern is whether parties to an
arbitration are entitled to a minimal level of due process in the
arbitral adjudication of their rights.3 ° For example, parties to an
arbitration have challenged arbitral awards in court on the grounds
that the arbitrator or process denied them constitutional rights to
due process, ajury trial, or an Article III forum.' 3' Yet constitutional
requirements for due process apply to arbitral proceedings only if
such a process constitutes state action.'32 Absent such a finding, the
arbitral proceeding remains an entirely private action that presum-
ably invokes no constitutional protections, even if it were found to
violate the most core values of due process. 3 3 As discussed more
128. 9 U.S.C § 201 (2000) (adopting the United Nations Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(1)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (commonly known as the New York Convention), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.
convention.new.york.1958/doc (providing that "[rJecognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused ... [upon proof that tihe party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or
was otherwise unable to present his case ....")); see also, e.g., Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco
Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We have recognized that the defense provided for
in Article V(1)(b) essentially sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due
process, and that due process rights are entitled to full force under the Convention as defenses
to enforcement." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
129. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 50 (2003); Thurston
K Cromwell, Note, Arbitration and Its Collateral Estoppel Effect on Third Parties, 2000 J.
DisP. RESOL. 425, 428.
130. Some arbitration providers have developed and voluntarily adopted various due
process protocols; however, these protocols do not have the force of law. For examples of due
process protocols adopted by various organizations, see American Arbitration Association
Rules and Procedures, http'J/www.adr.org/Protocols (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).
131. See, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460,
1466, 1468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
132. See infra Part II.B.
133. See infra Part II.B.
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fully below, few courts have been willing to hold that a private
participatory arbitration proceeding constitutes state action.134
However, class arbitration proceedings are significantly different,
particularly in the hybrid approaches, and due process scrutiny is
perhaps warranted. The following Part examines the application of
constitutional due process in contractual participatory arbitration
and in the context of class arbitration.
B. The State Action Requirement: Is Arbitration State Action?
Although the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically
apply to the state, a private entity may be held accountable to
constitutional standards if its actions are "fairly attributable" to the
state.3 5 The traditional jurisprudential test for holding a private
entity to constitutional standards requires a finding of "state
action."'36
1. Defining State Action
The Constitution holds governmental bodies accountable for
protecting individual rights and liberties. By contrast, no constitu-
tional action may be maintained against purely private parties.
Under the state action doctrine, however, when a private person or
entity acts on behalf of the state, or is so entwined with the state in
particular conduct, that ostensibly private activity constitutes state
action invoking constitutional protection.'37 The "[sitate action
doctrine remains the primary tool courts use to ensure that private
actors do not wield government power outside of constitutional
constraints." 3 '
134. See infra Part II.C.3.
135. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
136. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (noting the due
process clause affords "no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be," against private
conduct as distinguished from state action).
137. See Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38
GA. L. REV. 1145, 1163 (2004). The purpose of the state action doctrine is to "assure0 the
maintenance of the public/private dichotomy that lies at the very heart of liberal democratic
theory." Id.
138. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 1367,1410 (2003).
20061 1745
1746 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1711
2. The Two-Part Test
Precisely identifying when seemingly private conduct rises to
the level of state action is often uncertain.'39 In recent years, the
Supreme Court has employed a two-part analytical framework for
assessing when private conduct may be deemed state action:
140
First, has "the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from
the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state author-
ity"?' 4 ' Second, can the private party charged with the deprivation
fairly be described as a state actor?
4 1
The first prong is generally satisfied where a private party acted
"with the knowledge of and pursuant to" a state or federal statute.'
43
Although statutes encouraging or supporting private conduct can
represent state action,'" Lugar emphasized that private conduct
139. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1165 & n.77 (noting several authorities agreeing
that the state action doctrine is controversial and a conceptual disaster); Metzger, supra note
138, at 1414 ("[Tlhe line of division separating state and private action remains far from
straight.").
140. This test was first expressed in Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, in which the Court found state
action where a Virginia statutory prejudgment attachment procedure permitted a creditor to
attach a debtor's property if a creditor believed that a debtor would dispose of the property
to defeat the creditor, and repeated in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620
(1991), in which the Court found state action when a private attorney exercised use of
peremptory challenges.
141. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
142. Id.
143. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 931 n.14 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162
n.23 (1970)); see also infra Part II.C.2.a.
144. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state
action where private restaurant discriminated on the basis of race because the State leased
the premise to the private enterprise and thereby had "so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity"); see also Jeffrey L. Fisher, State Action and the Enforcement of
CompulsoryArbitrationAgreementsAgainst Employment Discrimination Claims, 18 HOFSTRA
LAB. & Emp. L.J. 289, 292 n.15, 293 (2000). Fisher cites three early cases that held that the
state action doctrine was violated: Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 76 (1932); and McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235
U.S. 151, 162 (1914). The Nixon Court concluded that "a statute empowering the executive
committee of a political party to prescribe the qualifications of its members constituted state
action because it gave the party the legal authority, which it may not have had previously, to
bar African Americans from voting in primaries." Fisher, supra, at 292 n.15. In McCabe, "a
statute that authorized carriers to provide railroad cars for Whites but not for African
Americans constituted state action because carriers refusing to serve African Americans
would be 'acting in the matter under the authority of state law.' Id. The Reitman Court
affirmed a decision of the California Supreme Court holding invalid a state constitutional
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pursuant to a statute, without more, is not enough to characterize
a private party as a "state actor" for purposes of the Due Process
Clause. 145 Rather, "something more" is required to convert a private
party into a state actor. 146 Thus, the second step, the state actor
inquiry, contemplates whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action." 47 With this frame-
work, the following considers whether class arbitration may
constitute state action and thus invoke due process protections,
beginning with an examination of how the question has been
addressed in the context of participatory arbitration.'4
amendment that allowed private individuals to discriminate on the basis of race when selling
or renting property. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375-76. The amendment constituted state action
because it "changed the situation from one in which discrimination was restricted (under state
law] to one wherein it [was] encouraged." Id. at 375 (internal quotation mark omitted); see
Fisher, supra, at 292-93. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972)
(finding no state action where the state's grant of a liquor license to a racially discriminating
private club was too remote a relationship); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,444 (1970) (finding
no state action where the state inherited property from private persons and allowed the heirs
to convert the property into a whites-only park in accordance with the will).
145. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
146. Id. The Lugar Court listed a number of different tests from past decisions that would
be sufficient to convert a private party into a state actor, including the "public function" test,
the "state compulsion" test, the "nexus" test, and the "joint action" test. Id.
147. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). Metzger notes that the Court
in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999),
insisted on state involvement in -the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains' ....
'[Tihe mere approval or acquiescence of the State' in a private entity's actions do not create
state action." Metzger, supra note 138, at 1414 (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 526
U.S. at 51-52); cf Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,290-
91 (2001) (finding association a state actor due to the "pervasive entwinement" between school
officials and the structure of the association); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621 (stating that without
the government's authorization the defendant "would not have been able to engage in the
alleged discriminatory acts"). Metzger observes that Sullivan and Brentwood take different
approaches but concludes that the Court generally takes a narrow view of state action.
Metzger, supra note 138, at 1414-15.
148. State action is involved in court-connected arbitration programs because the court
orders parties to arbitration as a prerequisite to trial. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1141.11(a)
(West 1982 & Supp. 2005) (requiring all civil cases worth less than $50,000 to be submitted
to arbitration as a condition for trial); Susan Keilitz, Court AnnexedArbitration, in NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH 36,37 (Susan Keilitz ed.,
1993); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 618-19 (1997). In such cases, however, parties retain their
constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial and due process, because they have the
option to reject an award and proceed to a judicial trial. Keilitz, supra, at 38. Therefore, while
court-enforced arbitration clearly involves state action, such action in contractual arbitration
is less obvious.
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C. Application of State Action Test to Private Contractual
(Participatory) Arbitration
1. Does Private Contractual Arbitration Constitute State Action?
Although few courts have addressed the issue, legal scholars have
provided thorough analyses of the state action doctrine's application
to mandatory contractual arbitration. Yet agreement has not
emerged. Professors Richard Reuben and Jean Sternlight have
argued that the comprehensive arbitration statutory schemes
providing forjudicial enforcement of private arbitration agreements,
broad arbitral powers to subpoena, sanction, and administer
discovery, as well as a private arbitrator's performance of tradi-
tional government functions establish the requisite elements of
state action.149 With respect to the application of constitutional
norms in arbitrator selection, other academics have concluded that
arbitration does not involve state action. 5 ° The few courts that have
addressed the state action question in individual arbitration cases
have largely rejected the theory.'5 ' To date, however, no reported
decision has addressed the issue of state action in a classwide
arbitration where, by its very nature, the rights of nonparticipatory
absent class members are decided and extinguished, and a court
may or may not be involved in decisions designed to protect the due
process rights of all class members. The prospect of state action
149. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCIAL. REV. 949,997-99, 1004-06 (2000) [hereinafter
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity]; Reuben, supra note 148, at 613-41; Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration:
A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL.
L. REv. 1, 40-47 (1997); see Brunet, supra note 128, at 112-13; Fisher, supra note 145, at 292.
But see Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial Review ofArbitral Punitive Damages
Awards, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 583, 608-14 (1995) (suggesting that the "pervasive federal scheme
regulating labor relations suggests that labor arbitration has more characteristics of state
action than does commercial arbitration").
150. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1195; Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in
Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of
State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 559-67 (1994).
151. Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1161 ("Every federal court considering the question
[of whether judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements rises to the level of state action]
has concluded that there is no state action present in contractual arbitration."); see also
infra Part II.C.3.
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under the hybrid approach to classwide arbitration appears more
pronounced.
2. Arguments in Favor of Finding Arbitration as State Action
Courts and legal scholars disagree on the question of whether
state action is present in private contractual (participatory)
arbitration, particularly when courts enforce arbitration agreements
and awards." 2 Professors Reuben153 and Sternlight"' have applied
the state action legal tests to private contractual arbitration and
contend that sufficient elements of state action exist in private
individual arbitration.
a. Arbitration's Source in State Authority
With respect to the first element of the state action test,'
55
Professor Reuben finds sufficient that "[ciontractually enforced
arbitration ... has its source in state authority by virtue of the
statutory schemes providing for the specific performance of those
152. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1163 (noting commentators' arguments for state
action in arbitration, but suggesting that the Supreme Court will find no state action).
153. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 149, at 989-1017; Reuben, supra note
148, at 609 (contending that private contractual arbitration can rise to the level of state action
because "[tihe state has established the structure through which such hearings are often
compelled and legally binding ... through ... the delegation of traditionally exclusive
governmental power over binding dispute resolution to a private ADR provider-and is an
active partner of the private party in the integrated execution of that structure").
154. See Sternlight, supra note 149, at 40-46 (asserting "state action" because (1) courts use
a "preference" for arbitration to interpret contracts, and (2) the courts' role in compelling
arbitration and in confirming and enforcing arbitration awards is integral to the process).
Sternlight also asserts
that the Supreme Court engaged in state action when it interpreted the FAA to
require courts to favor arbitration over litigation by interpreting ambiguous
contracts to state a preference for arbitration rather than litigation. Because it
is not clear (by definition of ambiguity) that the parties wanted arbitration, the
state's preference to compel it is, in essence, state action.... Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court engaged in state action when it held that the favoritism due
arbitration required that defenses to the arbitration contract (such as waiver or
delay) should be interpreted narrowly.
Id. at 44-45 (footnotes omitted); see also Fisher, supra note 145, at 298 (arguing that
compulsory arbitration pursuant to a statute constitutes state action).
155. See supra Part II.B.2. The first inquiry in determining state action is "whether the
claimed [constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
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contractual provisions."'56 The Supreme Court has found the first
element satisfied when a private actor conducts business by means
of statutory or judicial authority.5 7 For example, in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., the Court ruled that state action existed when
a Virginia statutory procedure allowed creditors to attach a debtor's
property if the creditor believed that the debtor would dispose of the
property in an attempt to avoid creditors.'58 Finding that this
"procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product
of state action," the Court concluded that use of this statutory
mechanism by private parties had its source in state authority.'59
In arguing that the FAA and related state arbitration statutes
satisfy the state actor test, Professor Reuben notes that California's
statutory scheme authorizes private parties to obtain judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards and "for the
court to retain an active supervisory role even after the case has
been ordered to arbitration ... [by authorizing] the trial court to
correct, modify, or vacate an arbitration award.""6 Moreover,
Reuben states:
Perhaps most significantly, the statute authorizes the court to
confirm the award as a judgment, thus making it available for
enforcement as any other judgment, with the full panoply of
vehicles available for enforcement, including garnishment and
attachment.
Finally, in both the court-related and contractual arbitration
situations, the additional benefits conferred upon the [arbitra-
156. Reuben, supra note 148, at 619.
157. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Reuben, supra note 148, at 613; see also supra notes 140-
46 and accompanying text.
158. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
159. Id.
160. Reuben, supra note 148, at 628. For example, courts decide whether to compel
arbitration. In making this determination, the court must consider the validity of the
arbitration provision and any defense to the contract that may be raised under state law. See
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995) (finding that under the FAA,
the courts-not the arbitrators-have the responsibility to determine if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate the merits of the dispute). If the motion is granted, the trial court may stay
the litigation while arbitration is pending, supervise the arbitration proceedings, and once an
award decision is made, the judge may then confirm, modify, or vacate in his or her discretion.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 13 (2000). Once the judge has confirmed or modified the arbitration award,
the award becomes an enforceable judgment like any other judgment from the court. See id.
§§ 2, 13.
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tors] are substantial. They are statutorily vested with broad
judicial powers to administer depositions and discovery, includ-
ing subpoena and sanction powers. They also receive the same
'judicial' immunity from civil liability that is reserved exclusively
for the states' own constitutionally authorized judiciary.'61
Proponents of finding state action in arbitration argue that arbitra-
tion's source lies in state authority because governmental authority
plays an active role in arbitration through the broad statutory and
judicial support for arbitration.'62 The FAA's statutory procedure
authorizes private arbitrants to adjudicate a party's rights in which
he or she has a property interest without a guarantee of due
process. In this respect, private arbitration is similar to the
statutory repossession laws in Lugar and Fuentes v. Shevin.' 6 In
Fuentes, the Court held that although the contract provided for
summary repossession by the seller upon the buyer's default, it did
not amount to an agreement that the creditor could repossess the
property without due process to the buyer or to a waiver of the
buyer's procedural due process rights."6 Statutory authorization for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards rendered without due
process likens arbitration to Lugar's prejudgment attachment
procedure." 5 Is arbitration perhaps akin to the private repo man?
161. Reuben, supra note 148, at 628-29 (footnotes omitted).
162. See, e.g., id. at 589, 609-10. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the FAA
represents a national policy favoring arbitration. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,626 (1985) (holding that while "the parties' intentions
control, [they] are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability"); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts,
and that the FAA preempts conflicting state statutes); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (holding that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration").
163. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
164. Id. at 94-96. Consumers challenged the constitutionality of the Florida and
Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin procedures under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 70-72. The Court held the contract provisions for repossession
by the seller upon default did not amount to a waiver of buyer's procedural due process rights
because they did not contain a prior hearing nor indicate the procedure by which repossession
was to be achieved. Id. at 94-96.
165. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 & n.21 (1982) (limiting the
Court's holding to prejudgment attachment situations but recognizing state action has been
found in a variety of different contexts); see also Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92-93 (stating "[tihe
replevin of chattels ... may satisfy a debt or settle a score. But state intervention in a private
dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war effort or protecting the public
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b. The Arbitrator as a State Actor and State Nexus with
Arbitration
The second inquiry in determining whether state action exists
asks whether the private conduct can fairly be described as a state
action and focuses on a nexus between the state and challenged
action. The "nexus" prong of the test considers whether the action
of the private party can be linked to an action of the government
sufficient to warrant attribution of the private entity's conduct to
the state.' Criteria used in this nexus or entanglement determina-
tion include considering "(1) the extent to which the actor relies on
governmental assistance and benefits; (2) whether the actor is
performing a traditional governmental function; and (3) whether the
injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority.""' In essence, this inquiry asks "whether
there is symbiotic interdependence between the government and the
private party."'68
i. Arbitration's Reliance on Governmental Assistance
In assessing a nexus with, or reliance upon, governmental
assistance, courts consider factors such as the degree to which
government servants actively participate in, facilitate, and give
effect to private choices, particularly for conduct that would be
unconstitutional if the state engaged in it."9 A public nexus can be
health," which would justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing).
166. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
167. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Metzger, supra note 138, at 1412 & n.151 (describing test as "[1] whether the private
entity is performing a public or government function; [2] whether the government compelled
or significantly encouraged the challenged action; [and 31 whether the government jointly
participated in the action").
168. Metzger, supra note 138, at 1412.
169. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (finding state action in
a private attorney's exercise of peremptory challenges); Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478,486 (1988) ("[W]hen private parties make use of state procedures with the
overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found."); Lugar, 457 U.S. at
939; id. at 950-51 (Powell, J., dissenting); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961); cf Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S 435, 444 (1970) (finding no state action where the
state inherited property from private persons and allowed the heirs to convert the property
into a whites-only park in accordance with the will).
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found where the government regulates, endorses, or financially
supports a private actor.7 ° For example, in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, the Court found the discriminatory actions of a
privately run coffee shop to be the actions of the government
because the government financed and regulated the physical space
of the coffee shop.'7 ' The Court determined that the financial
relationship and appearance of government regulation constituted
state action, requiring enforcement of constitutional protections.
17 2
Following Burton, the Court has refined and expanded the analysis
of relationship and appearance to include a fact-specific inquiry into
the entanglement and "entwinement" of the parties. 73
FAA provisions supporting arbitration exhibit arbitration's
reliance on governmental assistance. Typically, a litigant files a
motion to compel arbitration.'74 Once the court receives motion to
compel, the trial court must decide whether or not to compel
arbitration.175 In making this determination, the court must
consider the validity of the arbitration provision and any defense to
the contract that may be raised. 7 ' If the motion is granted, the trial
court may stay the litigation while arbitration is pending and
supervise the arbitration proceedings. 77 Once an award has been
decided, the judge may then confirm, modify, 7 ' or vacate it. 1 79 As
soon as the judge has confirmed or modified the arbitration award,
the award becomes an enforceable judicial judgment.8 0
170. See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621; Pope, 485 U.S. at 487; Burton, 365 U.S. at 722-
24.
171. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
172. Id.
173. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,295 (2001)
(noting that "no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding
state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some
countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government").
174. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2000).
175. Id. § 4.
176. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-45 (1995).
177. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
178. Id. § 11.
179. Id. § 10.
180. Id. §§ 2, 9, 13. Under California law, an arbitration award is subject to enforcement
through garnishment and attachment. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 481.010-493.060 (West 1982
& Supp. 2005).
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ii. Arbitration Performs a Traditional Public Function
A primary focus of the nexus inquiry also considers whether the
private actor performs a traditional governmental function. 1 ' When
the state delegates one of its functions to a private actor, constitu-
tional violations that result from the private actor acting under color
of law are deemed to be state action.1 8 2 Proponents of finding state
action in arbitration maintain that arbitration performs a function
traditionally reserved for the courts-the binding resolution and
adjudication of private disputes.8 3 Professor Reuben notes that
arbitration statutes delegate judge-like authority to arbitrators and
arbitration hearings." The FAA turns over cases that ordinarily
would have been heard by state and federal courts to arbitration
proceedings.8 " Statutes vest arbitrators with broad judicial
powers-such as the power to administer depositions, solve
discovery issues, order subpoenas, and sanction parties.8 " In
addition, the law generally provides arbitrators with immunity
similar to that of their judicial counterparts.8 7
181. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 506 (1946).
182. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1988) (finding state action where a private
doctor performed the government's constitutional obligation to provide medical care to
prisoners); see also id. at 56 n.14 (expressing concern that not finding state action would allow
states to avoid constitutional duties simply by contracting out for services).
183. See, e.g., Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 149, at 997.
184. See id. at 998.
Further analysis of contractual arbitration under a public function theory would
suggest that there are two delegations. Legislatures have delegated to
arbitrators decisional power over disputing parties that will be enforced by the
state, and parties have further contractually agreed both to delegate the power
to decide their dispute to an arbitrator and to be bound by that decision. Because
of these delegations, a central question for reviewing courts is whether the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his or her authority and therefore acted ultra
vires.
Id. at 998 n.226.
185. Before the FAA was enacted, courts were reluctant to cede adjudicatory authority to
arbitrators. Reuben, supra note 148, at 599-605. This reluctance to enforce private
agreements to arbitrate rendered such agreements essentially ineffective. See id. at 601.
Professor Reuben argues that judicial interpretation of the FAA and related state arbitration
statutes mandate that courts enforce contractual arbitration and essentially remove a case
before federal or state court and place it in the hands of private arbitrators. See id. at 603-05.
186. See id. at 597-98.
187. See id. at 597; see also Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age
of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 457-60 (2004) (arguing for
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Reuben asserts that the judicial function performed in arbitration
is analogous to the elective function performed by private political
parties in the White Primary Cases."s He states that "[b]oth
functions are expressly provided for in the Constitution, and both
are central to the maintenance of a democracy.... that ultimately
depends on that commitment for its very existence. Also, both
functions are delegated to private parties pursuant to statutory
schemes expressly authorizing such delegations." 8 '
Just as the Court found that the election function was a public
function because it was embedded in core democratic principles,
Reuben argues the role of the judiciary is similarly a public
function. 9 ° Arbitrators, while acting in ajudicial capacity, serve the
same function that lies at the very center of our democratic
system.'9' Arbitration statutes provide a significant nexus between
public actors and private parties and such "statutory delegation of
the judicial function to private arbitrators ... transforms the conduct
of those private adjudicators into state action."9 2 In sum, Reuben
a standard of qualified immunity for private arbitrators that balances competing policy
considerations).
188. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 149, at 998-99. The White Primary
Cases are classic examples of the public function doctrine. The Court held that when the state
of Texas allowed private political parties to run the primaries and the political parties
excluded any racial minorities from taking part in the political process vis-h-vis voting, the
political parties were "state actors" because taking control of the primaries and specifically
controlling who could vote were public functions. Id. at 995-96; see also Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944) (holding that a white primary was a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment because "[tihe party takes its character as a state agency from the duties
imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because
they are performed by a political party"); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (extending
Smith v. Allwright to all-white pre-primaries, even though no state law governed and no state
assistance was provided, because of the powerful influence the pre-primaries had on
elections).
189. Reuben, supra note 148, at 625; see U.S. CONST. art. I (providing for election and
power of legislators); id. art. III (providing for an independent judiciary); id. amends. XV, XIX
(generally barring abridgments of the right to vote).
190. Reuben, supra note 148, at 624-25.
191. Under the separation of powers doctrine, the legislative, executive, and judiciary
branches of the government each have "specified duties on which neither of the other
branches can encroach." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (7th ed. 1999). ' T]he doctrine of the
separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 94 (1957) (quoting Justice Louis Brandeis).
192. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 149, at 998; id. at 954 (advancing "a
unitary theory of public justice that is predicated upon the recognition that a significant
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contends that "contractual arbitration is erected on the foundation
of a statutory delegation of the traditionally exclusive public
function of binding dispute resolution."'93
iii. Aggravation of Injury by Incidents of Government
Authority
Incidents of governmental authority may further aggravate due
process violations sustained in arbitration, causing harm to the
individual and to society.'94 In further support of his state action
argument, Reuben contends that concomitant to its role of compel-
ling arbitration agreements and enforcing arbitration awards,
arbitrating parties may see the court as playing a significant and
crucial role in the private process.'95 Disputing parties will see the
court "place[] its power, prestige, and imprimatur behind the result
[of arbitration (i.e., the award)], regardless of any questions
surrounding the fairness of the process or the degree to which the
result departs from the public law." 9 ' He argues that this seeming
united front of judges and arbitrators, displayed in full view of the
public, implies to the individual that there is no other recourse.'97
The impression of a united front harms the individual if it leads to
portion of the modem ADR movement is built upon the foundation of state action"). Reuben
argues that much of modern ADR may not be private at all in that
the many state and federal statutes, executive orders, and court rules that by
necessity have provided the basic architecture for the modern movement have
done so by establishing a structure in which public and private actors participate
jointly in furthering the goal of binding dispute resolution. Public courts are
actively involved in the administration, oversight, and execution of such
processes in governmental ADR programs, often compelling or strongly
encouraging parties into those programs, often using private neutrals to
implement the programs, and often adopting the results of those ADR processes
as their own legally binding judgments. The involvement of public courts is
similarly woven into the fabric of the many federal and state contractual
arbitration statutes that overturned the courts' historic refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate.
Id. at 955. Reuben urges that constitutional norms could and should be incorporated into our
current ADR structure. See id. at 954-55.
193. Reuben, supra note 148, at 629.
194. See id. at 632-33.
195. Id. at 632.
196. Id.
197. See id.
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such a belief.19 If the individual fails to bring a case, this harms
society because such grievances go unredressed. The united front,
therefore, brings higher public policy considerations into focus.
The potential harm caused by the lack of mechanisms ensuring
arbitrator qualification and neutrality is compounded by the lack of
procedural safeguards. For example, arbitrators are not required to
inform parties of their rationale for granting or denying a claim and,
therefore, do not draft lengthy opinions summarizing their legal and
factual conclusions.'99 This makes the process of judicial review
more difficult, if not impossible. Additionally, judicial review is
constrained by the FAA, which prohibits courts from inspecting and
overturning arbitral awards except in cases of "manifest disregard
of the law. "2 °° Because of these differences between the courts and
arbitration, the deprivation of rights causes unique injury to those
individuals affected. The harm suffered is a loss of the benefits of
constitutional due process.2"'
3. Most Courts Reject State Action Theory for Participatory
Arbitration
Despite cogent arguments that extensive judicial and statutory
support of contractual arbitration can constitute state action, most
courts have rejected constitutional challenges raised by participants
198. See id.
199. Section 13(b) of the FAA requires the arbitration award to be filed with the court
clerk, implying that some writing is mandatory. See 9 U.S.C. § 13(b) (2000). However, all that
needs to be written is whether a party has been granted or denied relief, and if granted, what
relief was awarded. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."); Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 519, 522 (1960).
200. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); 9 U.S.C. § 10
(2000).
201.
By compelling, overseeing, and ultimately enforcing such decisions, the trial
court is both a direct and an indirect participant in the seemingly private
process of arbitration.... While it may be true that the hearing is conducted and
the decision reached outside the four walls of the public courtroom, that hearing
is conducted in the shadow of the courthouse, and its result is given effect,
meaning, and enforcement in the same public courtroom to which society turns
for final and binding resolution of other conflicts.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 149, at 1010.
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to a private arbitration primarily for two reasons. °2 First, courts
have, under a contract theory, concluded that parties to contractual
arbitration have waived constitutional rights in opting for a private
arbitral proceeding.2"' For example, in Koveleskie v. SBC Capital
Markets, Inc., the court rejected the plaintiffs claims that compul-
sory securities industry arbitration under federally compelled
procedures violated her rights under Article III, the Seventh
Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment, regardless of the presence
of state action, because she waived such rights by consenting to
arbitration through her broker-registration contract.2 Critics of the
contractual waiver theory argue that predispute arbitration
contracts typically are silent regarding constitutional rights and
that any such waiver is not truly consensual, voluntary, or
knowing.2"'
a. Governmental Authorization Is Not Entanglement
The basis for most judicial conclusions that private contractual
arbitration lacks the requisite state action is that contractual
arbitration is a matter of private contract, however adhesive, and
involves private parties and a private arbitrator in a private
process."' Courts have held a government statute that provides the
202. See Brunet, supra note 128, at 109 (acknowledging that "[amny contention that
constitutional rights exist in arbitration runs the risk of summary rejection because of the
absence of state action").
203. See id. at 102 (noting that parties to an arbitration contract "expressly agree to a
procedure with minimal legal rights").
204. 167 F.3d 361, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1999).
205. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 128, at 102-04 (advising that "[clourts should be reluctant
to enforce automatically a superficially consensual arbitration clause without" careful
examination of consent); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise
of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 669-71,
678-79 (2001).
206. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1161 & n.68 ("Every federal court considering
the question has concluded that there is no state action present in contractual arbitration.");
see also Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
plaintiff's constitutional claims that the application or enforcement of the mandatory
arbitration clause in securities employment requires her to forfeit her constitutional rights
to due process, a jury trial, and an Article III judicial forum). The Second Circuit explained:
NASD is a private actor, not a state actor. It is a private corporation that
receives no federal or state funding. Its creation was not mandated by statute,
nor does the government appoint its members or serve on any NASD board or
committee. Moreover, the fact that a business entity is subject to "extensive and
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legal authority for courts to enforce arbitral agreements or awards
does not itself constitute state action or create a nexus between the
government and private actors in arbitration.2 °v Aside from a
narrow application in Shelley v. Kraemer, which held that judicial
enforcement of a private, racially restrictive covenant constituted
state action,2 °8 courts have refused to extend a finding of state action
based on judicial enforcement of a private contract because such a
holding could otherwise transform all judicial enforcement of
detailed" state regulation does not convert that organization's actions into those
of the state.
Id.; see also Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-92 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming
district court's confirmation of arbitrator's award of punitive damages and rejecting
defendant's due process claim because arbitration proceeding did not constitute state action);
FDIC v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that "the arbitration
involved ... was private, not state, action; it was conducted pursuant to contract by a private
arbitrator. Although Congress ... has provided for some governmental regulation of private
arbitration agreements, we do not find in private arbitration proceedings the state action
requisite for a constitutional due process claim"); Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782
F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that "the fact that a private arbitrator denies the
procedural safeguards that are encompassed by the term 'due process of law' cannot give rise
to a constitutional complaint"); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (following the Second Circuit's Desiderio ruling that Title VII does not preclude
mandatory arbitration and holding that although the NASD "straddle[s] the border between
the private and public realms," it remains a private actor under the state action doctrine);
Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1465-66 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (holding that a privately mandated arbitration did not amount to state action because
it could not be "fairly attributed" to the government, even though the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) permitted stock exchanges to create their own registration and arbitration
rules for associated individuals, thus, the deprivation of rights to a jury trial and to an Article
III judicial forum was not a due process violation); Intl Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators &
Asbestos Workers Local Union 42 v. Absolute Envtl. Servs., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392,402-03 (D.
Del. 1993) (finding no state action in "arbitration proceedings pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement between private parties"); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 716
F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the conduct of an arbitration panel "did not
in any way constitute state action"), affd, 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990).
207. See, e.g., Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,351
(1974)); Elmore, 782 F.2d at 96-97 (finding no state action in arbitration mandated by the
Federal Railway Labor Act because of the federal policy of minimizing judicial intervention
in railroad industry labor disputes); see also Reuben, supra note 148, at 615-17 (countering
but acknowledging arguments that no state action is implicated when "contractual arbitration
statutes merely authorize private parties to resolve disputes in a particular way").
208. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948) (concluding that judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant is not permitted because it would, in effect, be enforcing an
unconstitutional race-based classification). Shelley has been cited for the proposition that
state action results when the government enforces the actions or contracts involving private
individuals; however, its application has been limited to racial contexts.
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private contracts into state action."9 Professors Cole and Spitko, for
example, also criticize the argument that a national pro-arbitration
policy provides a sufficient nexus for state action in arbitration,
concluding "[it would be dangerous precedent to state that every
time a court or other governmental actor announces a federal policy,
state action exists when a private party attempts to carry out that
policy."2 10 Courts have also rejected the argument that state action
results from judicial action confirming an arbitral award into a
"court order, violation of which could be punished by contempt."211
b. Dispute Resolution Is Not an Exclusive Public Function
The argument that arbitration constitutes state action under the
second prong, requiring a showing of public function or state actor,
has also failed in the courts.212 Although a private arbitrator may
209. See Davis, 59 F.3d at 1192 (stating that courts have limited Shelley to the racial
discrimination context); Cole & Spitko, supra note 139, at 1193; Rueben, supra note 148, at
626.
210. Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1189-91.
211. Id. at 1192-93; cf MedvalUSA Health Programs v. Memberworks, Inc., 2003 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1633, at *13-14 n.5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 22, 2003), affd, 872 A.2d 423, 429-
30, 434-35 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7665 (Oct. 17, 2005). "While it is not
greatly disputed that the arbitral process itself does not constitute state action, there is some
disagreement as to whether the judicial proceeding confirming or vacating the arbitration
award implicates state action." Id. (citing Davis, 59 F.3d at 1192; Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed,
Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 269-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (holding it unnecessary to apply
constitutional due process to judicial confirmation of an arbitral award of punitive damages
because such appeals can be based on arbitrariness and irrationality under the FAA)). Other
courts have applied a "limited degree of state action" to confirming arbitration awards. See
id. (citing Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
Some courts sidestep the issue but recognize the "potential dichotomy between the arbitral
and judicial proceedings." Id. (citing Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138-
39 (6th Cir. 1996); Commonwealth Assocs. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 n.37 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)). In summary, the MedvalUSA court concluded that "[wihile these divergent views
provide interesting fodder for law review articles and footnotes injudicial opinions, the weight
of authority at the present time is consistent with the view in Sawtelle v. Wadell & Reed, Inc.,
that neither the arbitral process itself nor the confirmation proceeding involve state action."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
212. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972) (granting of a state
liquor license to a racially exclusive private club did not constitute state action). Professor
Reuben counters the argument that "contractual arbitration statutes merely authorize private
parties to resolve disputes in a particular way." Reuben, supra note 148, at 615. He
acknowledges that "[in the ADR context, the argument against the existence of state action
would be that actions of the ADR neutral that raise constitutional problems could be no more
attributed to the state than could the Moose Lodge's decision to discriminate on the basis of
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receive immunity protections similar to those accorded a state or
federal judge, a private arbitrator is not considered a "state
actor" for purposes of state action. Moreover, although binding
dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is a traditional government
function,21 it is not considered an exclusive government function,
because arbitration has served as a form of binding dispute
resolution for centuries, even without court involvement.214 Profes-
sors Cole and Spitko acknowledge merit in the argument for finding
state action in arbitration under a public function doctrine, but they
contend that the availability of judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements or awards "does not transform binding dispute resolu-
tion into a public function."2" For similar reasons, the court in
Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. held that a
privately mandated arbitration, which deprived a plaintiff of a right
to a jury trial, an Article III judicial forum, or due process
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment, was not an assump-
tion of traditional government functions when adjudicating
discrimination claims and did not transform a private actor into a
state actor.216 Because the parties, not the government, delegate
authority to the arbitrator to resolve the dispute, arbitration is
different from the governmental delegation of running elections or
education.217
race." Id. However, the Lugar Court found "state action in what a Moose Lodge analysis would
have concluded was a creditor's purely private choice of electing to secure its rights through
the prejudgment attachment procedure, a choice in which the government played absolutely
no part." Id. at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). He adds that Edmondson, which
found state action in a private attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge, "provides an
even more compelling example." Id.
213. See Reuben, supra note 148, at 621 (stating that "the state-enforced resolution of
disputes ... distinguishes matters of constitutional moment from those of purely private
concern").
214. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1194-95. But see Reuben, supra note 148, at 621
("The binding resolution of disputes is, of course, a traditionally exclusive public function.").
215. See Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1195.
216. 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1466, 1468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1978) (rejecting the argument that the state had delegated the "public
function" of dispute resolution to a private actor); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D.
134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (following Second Circuit's Desiderio ruling that Title VII does
not preclude mandatory arbitration and concluding no due process claim exists because NASD
is not a state actor); Porush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying due
process challenge to arbitral award because "private arbitrators are not state actors and,
absent state action, there can be no violation of [the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments]").
217. Cole & Spitko, supra note 137, at 1195.
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Professor Brunet argues that a nexus exists in arbitration
because arbitration relies on governmental participation and aid in
the form of broad court enforcement. He asserts that more than
mere court enforcement is involved in arbitration:
[T]he ability to obtain quick and routine judicial stays .... [and
tihe courts' need for arbitration as a docket clearing device has
created a mutually beneficial relationship between courts and
the private arbitration establishment. As it now stands, the
modem interpretation of the FAA has created a federal delega-
tion to private parties and encourages them to resolve disputes
in private at their expense in return for easy and public court
enforcement. In sum, a tenable argument for Shelley-style state
action exists.21
Yet, the Supreme Court's "contraction of the state-action doctrine
means an uphill fight" for requiring constitutional due process in
arbitration.219 The clear weight of authority to date refuses to find
that private contractual arbitration constitutes state action,
irrespective of the strong national policy favoring arbitration,
presumptions of arbitrability, or statutory authorization for broad
judicial support of private contractual arbitration.
4. The Status of Constitutional Rights in Arbitration
The idea that private arbitration can escape scrutiny of charges
that it denied one or more participants constitutional rights based
on the lack of state action is doctrinally consistent with Supreme
Court jurisprudence, but practically and morally problematic.
Should parties who are discriminated against on the basis of race or
gender by an arbitrator have no recourse? Even corporate entities
charged with exorbitant punitive damage awards in arbitration
have met rejection in asserting claims for requiring due process and
constitutional limits on such awards. Arbitration need not afford the
same level of due process and protections required of the courts, and
the FAA provides some level of recourse against serious misconduct
or procedural irregularity in the arbitral process. However, private
218. Brunet, supra note 128, at 113.
219. Id.
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parties' inability to raise constitutional challenges to arbitral
awards becomes particularly problematic in the context of class
arbitration.
D. Application of State Action Analysis to Class Arbitration:
A Case for Finding State Action
1. A Hypothetical Primer
Suppose Person X seeks to sue Company Z on a claim that was
the basis for a prior class arbitration. Company Z asserts two
defenses: first, that X cannot sue in court because X is bound by the
arbitration provision in the parties' contract; and second, that X's
claim must be dismissed on the grounds that it was extinguished as
part of the class arbitration judgment under the claim preclusion
doctrine. X argues that she is not bound by the class arbitral award
because she did not receive adequate notice, was not adequately
represented, or was not part of the class, and thus her due process
rights were violated and the award is void as it applies to her.
This scenario raises several questions. First, who rules on the
objections-the arbitrator or the court? If X is bound by contract to
arbitrate, presumably an arbitrator would decide. Second, on the
merits of the due process and claim preclusion arguments, who
wins? The defense may argue that the class arbitrator determined
that X was part of the certified class and thus X is bound by the
judgment, or that the class arbitration was not state action and thus
X has no right to due process protection or to second guess the
arbitrator's ruling. In other words, bound is bound. Third, what is
plaintiffs recourse? On what grounds could a court or arbitrator
review the underlying class arbitral procedure to assess the
adequacy of notice and process fairness? In short, do absent
members have any due process rights in class arbitration?
The effect of a class arbitral award, which under the FAA, may be
judicially confirmed and entered as a judgment, is to adjudicate and
thereby cut off the rights of all class members. In a judicial class
judgment, absent class members whose interests were adequately
represented are bound by the final disposition of the case.2 ° What
220. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-14 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee,
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then do we make of the objection subsequently advanced by a
nonparticipating member of a class arbitral judgment?
2. Significant State-Private Nexus Under the Hybrid
Approaches
Although courts have largely rejected the argument that private
contractual arbitration constitutes state action, unique characteris-
tics in class arbitration suggest that state action in this process is
more pronounced and that procedural protections are warranted.
Despite the varied scope of procedural protections in arbitration,
parties in a participatory arbitration at least know about the
arbitration and the scope of the arbitrator's powers."' In a class
arbitral setting, absent class members, by definition, do not actively
participate in the process or necessarily know of the action.
Although the process for administering a class arbitration is not
specifically regulated by statute,222 significant court involvement is
maintained under either of the hybrid approaches. Unlike the
judicial role in participatory arbitration under the FAA, where the
court is limited to a procedural role in enforcing agreements to
arbitrate and arbitral awards, court involvement in either of the
hybrid approaches is more extensive and continuous.223
Courts addressing the concept of class actions in arbitration have
largely contemplated a continued, significant judicial role in
overseeing key aspects of the class arbitration under a hybrid
approach, in order to protect the rights of the absent members.224
311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
221. See Mandl v. Bailey, 858 A.2d 508, 521 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) ("When parties to
an arbitration knowingly and voluntarily agree upon the rules of procedure that will govern
the arbitration of their disputes, ... courts will recognize the validity of such procedures, so
long as they comport with basic requirements of due process." (emphasis added)).
222. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part I.B.2.a-b.
224. See, e.g., Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(acknowledging a hybrid class arbitration procedure whereby a court certifies a class and then
orders an arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("[We find that this class action, if properly
certified, may continue through arbitration on a class-wide basis. We therefore remand to the
trial court for class certification proceedings. After this ruling, the trial court must compel
arbitration."); see also Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions: A Contradiction in
Terms, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 2004, at 215,245 (PLI Corporate Law
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The hybrid approaches recognize the need to permit parties an
option to some judicial recourse. This interaction between the courts
and private arbitrators in a hybrid administration creates a
heightened level of governmental assistance tantamount to state
action. For example, judicial involvement in key aspects of the class
certification, notice and supervision, adequacy of representation,
and fairness assessment of settlement or case disposition inherently
obligates a court to do more than simply enforce an arbitral
agreement or award. The court must implicitly, or even expressly,
consider the merits of the underlying dispute in order to fulfill the
role under either of the hybrid approaches. Thus, where the court is
involved in administering class arbitration, the judge, a state actor,
becomes integrally involved in critical classwide arbitration
decisions.225
In applying the jurisprudential analysis to class arbitration, state
action exists, at a minimum, under the hybrid approaches. First,
although private conduct pursuant to a statutory scheme does not,
ipso facto, convert to state action, the FAA and governmental
assistance, through the judicial enforcement of arbitral procedures,
provides a scheme that would not exist absent an element of state
action. Further indicia of state action exist in classwide arbitration.
The hybrid approaches call for judicial administration or judicial
confirmation of critical arbitral decisions affecting notice, adequacy
of representation, and fairness disposition, and, by definition, rely
on governmental assistance for legitimacy. Any legitimacy to the
class arbitration process is premised on the express or implied
assurance that recourse to a public forum, the judicial branch of
government, is available. The ability of private entities that sell
arbitration services to advertise and assure parties of the availabil-
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1414, 2004) ("Both Dickler and Keating envisioned
a hybrid procedure in which the court would retain jurisdiction over the class certification
process while the arbitrator would adjudicate the merits of the claim.").
225. See supra Part I.B.1.b (discussing expectation of continued judicial role in classwide
arbitrations); see also Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (affirming
that the court, not the arbitrator, will make initial determinations regarding certification and
notice, and noting the balance between the required judicial supervision and the potential
slippery slope of judicial involvement in class arbitration), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The court stated that "[a] good deal of care, and
ingenuity, would be required to avoid judicial intrusion upon the merits of the dispute ... and
to minimize complexity, costs, or delay." Id.; Waltcher, supra note 90 (asserting that judicial
discretion must exist to protect absentees' due process rights).
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ity of at least some judicial review bolsters their credibility and
reinforces parties' hope for a fair process. An arbitrator administer-
ing and adjudicating a class arbitration certainly performs a
function, albeit in private, traditionally and exclusively performed
by a court. Thus, the significant judicial role in the hybrid model
warrants the conclusion that state action is present.
3. Permitting Escape From Any Court Involvement: Practical
Absurdity
When a court remains involved in key aspects of administering
class arbitration, a stronger case for state action and corresponding
due process rights exists. However, the alternative Lackey model,
which avoids all court involvement in class arbitration, seemingly
bypasses state action and thus the obligation to provide constitu-
tional due process.2 '6 Yet, the risks to absent class members in a
class arbitration with no judicial involvement are more grave than
the minimal process options under the hybrid model. Providers
following the hybrid model attempt to offer some procedural
protections for absent class members, and integrity in a complicated
process, but this may sufficiently trigger state actor status and,
therefore, due process obligations. By contrast, those who ignore
traditional class procedural protections may conceivably avoid due
process scrutiny and thus eliminate all procedural safeguards for
absent class members. Certainly, it would be an absurd and unwise
policy to create an incentive for providers to eschew judicial
oversight and avoid due process obligations by using a class
arbitration approach.
4. Minimal Fair Process: A Political and Practical Necessity
Even if courts reject mandating constitutional due process in class
arbitrations through the state action doctrine, the concerns for a fair
process in class arbitrations are as significant, if not more, as they
are in judicial class actions, which are open to public view and
scrutiny. From a policy standpoint, if we allow class arbitration, the
rights of nonparticipatory class members should not be adjudicated
226. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
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without notice and other protections. Accordingly, as a matter of
constitutional, political, or practical necessity, some process must be
due in class arbitration.227
The Keating decision recognized the importance of a continuing
judicial role in class arbitrations. The court thought it was impor-
tant for a court to conduct class certification decisions. In addition,
Justice Richardson stated:
[Tihe court must notify class members of the existence of the
suit so that they will have the opportunity to "opt out." Because
of the due process safeguards required to keep class members
apprised of the course of the litigation, substantial judicial
involvement by the court will be required to monitor the
progress of the arbitration and potentially will undermine the
arbitrator's discretion. In fact, the court's due process responsi-
bilities include the duty to undertake a stringent and continuing
examination of the adequacy of representation by the named
class representative at all stages of the litigation.'
227. Professor Huber posits:
If the courts have no role in the certification process, as posited by Bazzle,
presumably the courts have no role during the arbitration process either. What
about protection of absent parties? Who will monitor the adequacy of
representation? Do the courts have a role in reviewing a settlement prior to a
class award? After an award, will the scope ofjudicial review be the same as for
other arbitral awards (extremely limited)? How is meaningful judicial review
possible in the absence of a record of the proceeding or a written decision, as is
standard in commercial, consumer, and employment arbitration?
Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class Arbitration, 7 J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 2, 10 (2003),
available at www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/CLJ_V7NlFalHO3.html.
228. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court observed:
If the alternative in a case of this sort is to force hundreds of individual [parties]
each to litigate its cause ... in a separate arbitral forum, then the prospect of
classwide arbitration, for all its difficulties, may offer a better, more efficient,
and fairer solution. Where that is so, and gross unfairness would result from the
denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis, then an order structuring
arbitration on that basis would be justified.
Id. at 1209; see also Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 361 n.21 (S.C. 2002)
(noting that "preclusion of class-wide or consolidated arbitration in an adhesion contract, even
if explicit, undermines principles favoring expeditious and equitable case disposition absent
demonstrated prejudice to the drafter of the adhesive contract"), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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III. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE IN CLASS ARBITRATION: BY LAW OR
NECESSITY?
A. Procedural Fairness in Class Arbitration
Concerns for procedural fairness are significant in any
adjudicative forum, whether public or private. When a court
remains involved in key aspects of administering a class arbitration,
the argument for finding state action and corresponding rights for
due process merits attention. Even if courts avoid mandating
constitutional due process in class arbitrations, the concerns for a
fair process in class arbitrations are as significant, if not more, as in
judicial class actions, which are open to public view and scrutiny. In
arbitral class actions, all members have not necessarily agreed to
proceed, and no procedural rules mandate either notice or assurance
that members' rights will be adequately protected.
Assuming that class arbitration requires a level of due process
either as a constitutional or politically practical matter, what
procedure must be present in arbitration to protect the due process
rights of class members?229 Although it is a flexible concept, due
process requires "fundamental fairness."23 0 Courts have construed
this provision to require that an individual be given notice and an
opportunity for a hearing prior to any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property interest.23' Notice is a fundamental component of due
232process. 2 In the judicial class action context, due process is the
229. The due process issue implicit in classwide arbitration is whether such arbitration is
unconstitutional when it lacks adequate procedural protections. See Sternlight, supra note
149, at 80-81.
230. For all its consequences, "due process" has never been, and perhaps never can be,
precisely defined. As the Supreme Court explained, due process, "unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ("Applying the Due Process Clause
is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what fundamental fairness' consists
of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing
the several interests that are at stake.").
231. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); see also Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) ("[There has been a failure of due process only in those cases
where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the
interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.").
232. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(holding that a "fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
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source for many requirements including the right of class members
to opt out of the proceedings, the adequacy of representation,
judicial oversight, and case disposition fairness approval.233 The
following Part considers the scope of due process in the context of
class arbitration.
B. Defining Due Process for Class Arbitration
Assuming class arbitration invokes the prerequisite state action,
a due process inquiry asks (1) whether the party challenging the
procedure was deprived of a constitutional right to life, liberty, or
property; and (2) whether the party was provided with a procedure
that was "due" under the Constitution.
1. Constitutionally Protected Interests Are Invoked in Class
Arbitration
Assuming class arbitration invokes state action, due process
protections apply where a party is allegedly deprived of a constitu-
tional right. A judgment resulting from a class arbitral award,
potentially rendered without notice to absent members, may bind
class members and deprive them of their rights to property and to
adjudicate their claims individually.23 Consequently, the constitu-
tionally protected interests to property and adjudication of absent
members are invoked by a class arbitral award. Therefore, the only
real question is whether arbitration provides sufficient due process
protections for all class members.235
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections").
233. Outside the class action context, courts generally use the Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), balancing test to determine what level of procedure the due process
clause requires. Courts will balance the following factors: protecting the party's interest in
adequate process, the risk of erroneous decision making, and the government's interest in
expedited decision making. See id.
234. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 433 (1982) (stating that "a
cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause").
235. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Hansberry, 311 U.S.
at 42.
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2. What Procedure Is "Due" to Class Arbitrants?
Although due process is a flexible standard and can adapt to
various factual circumstances, it requires at a minimum that parties
be provided with (1) reasonable notice and (2) an opportunity to be
heard. A number of stages in class arbitration implicate due process
concerns. Analyzing these stages of class arbitration, step-by-step,
brings into focus the need for a degree of judicial participation to
protect the rights of class members.
a. Notice in Class Action Arbitration
Notice is an essential element of due process because it ensures
that individuals in jeopardy of serious loss will be apprised of the
situation and given a meaningful opportunity to present their
case.236 According to the Supreme Court, the "primary purpose of the
notice required by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the
opportunity for a hearing is meaningful."23 ' In other words, notice
must be provided "to apprise the affected individual of, and permit
adequate preparation for, an impending 'hearing.'"23 In the class
action setting, notice remains important because absent class
members may otherwise have their property rights in that litigation
foreclosed by the impact of claim preclusion rules without their
knowledge. Court procedural rules protect absentee members when
a similar action is brought in court,239 but arbitrators are not
required to apply such rules when the same action is brought in
arbitration. Thus, the question arises, how must arbitrators treat
the issue of notice in order to comport with due process?
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bazzle has significant implications
for the issue of class arbitration notice. The Bazzle Court held that
the arbitrator, not the judge, must make the decision whether,
under the contract, a class action may be maintained in
arbitration.24 ° The Court left open, however, whether the judge
236. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
237. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999) (emphasis added) (citing
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
238. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
239. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
240. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,447 (2003); Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare
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retains any responsibility when an arbitrator has determined class
arbitration permissible. Arguably, Bazzle relinquished judicial
involvement in class arbitration.24' Under a complete arbitral
approach, the arbitrator makes all decisions regarding the class
arbitration, including certification, notice, representation, and case
disposition. 2 The AAA rules contemplate similar arbitral duties,
but specify standards that largely mirror Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that provide an option for judicial
review. Like the AAA, other courts have also understood the
Bazzle ruling to bestow on arbitrators the responsibility of
overseeing notice. In Johnson v. Long John Silver's Restaurants,
Inc., the magistrate judge refused to address the issue regarding
court-supervised notice to class members until the district court
determined whether to compel arbitration or to hear the case in
court.2" The district court compelled arbitration, leaving to the
arbitrator the class certification decision.244 The district court
directed the termination of the case file and never addressed the
issue of notice.245
Yet the complete arbitral administration of class claims does not
guarantee fundamental due process rights to notice. Bazzle should
not be read so far as to authorize circumventing due process rights.
Proponents ofjudicial involvement in hybrid-form class arbitration
recognize that a court must remain responsible for decisions
affecting a person's due process rights.246 The AAA procedure seeks
to provide a level of due process, yet compliance with the procedure
is subject to AAA's self-regulation. Few other arbitration associa-
Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
241. Buckner, supra note 82, at 353-54.
242. See Am. ARBITRATION Ass'N SuPP. R. FOR ARBITRATIONS 6(a) (providing that "the
arbitrator shall ... direct that class members be provided the best notice practicable under the
circumstances ... [and that it] shall be given to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort"); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N SUPP. R. FOR ARBITRATIONS 6(b)
(enumerating eight elements that must be present in concise, clearly stated, and easily
understood language).
243. 320 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (M.D. Tenn. 2004), affd, 414 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005).
244. Id. at 668, 671.
245. Id.
246. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Thibodeau v. Comcast, No. 4546, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com.
Pl. LEXIS 59 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 24,2006) (announcing that "the trial court judge remains
responsible for all of the key procedural decisions that ensure fairness for named and
unnamed plaintiffs in the class, even in a class action removed to class arbitration").
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tions or providers have even attempted to adopt class procedural
rules. Until the Supreme Court or legislature outlines how arbitra-
tion providers must handle notice or otherwise direct that a court
retain responsibility for overseeing notice, arbitration providers
are free to determine their own rules, which may or may not
provide constitutionally sufficient notice to all class members with
a property interest at stake.
b. An Opportunity for Class Members To Be Heard and To
Opt Out
An opportunity to be heard is another way of saying that each
individual is entitled to a full and fair hearing. But what constitutes
a full and fair hearing? "[Riequirements of fairness ... extend to the
concluding parts of the procedure as well as to the beginning and
intermediate steps."247 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court
held that due process required that an absent plaintiff be provided
with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing
and returning an opt out.2 '
C. Unique Aspects of Class Arbitration Mandate Process
Protections
In addition to the essential requirements for notice and an
opportunity to be heard, class arbitration involves unique character-
istics which underscore the need for procedural protections for
absent class members-whether these protections are triggered by
a conclusion that class arbitration involves state action, or if not,
simply that public policy and practical necessity warrant some form
of fair process.
1. The Right To Select the Arbitrator
Parties in a participatory arbitration generally have the power to
select an arbitratorjointly in accordance with the method prescribed
247. Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963).
248. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
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by the arbitration agreement.249 In a class arbitration, however, the
named plaintiffs, or more likely the class attorney(s), will work in
conjunction with the defendant to select an arbitrator for the class
proceedings.25 ° The concern, after Bazzle, is that absent class
members can never take part in the selection process because the
class is not created at the time an arbitrator is chosen. Recall that
Bazzle held that the arbitrator must determine whether to allow a
class in the arbitration,25' which means the arbitrator must be
selected before the class is created. To protect the due process rights
of absent class members, Professor Sternlight argues for judicial
supervision over the selection process in class arbitration.252
Otherwise, "the absent class members will ultimately be bound by
the ruling of an arbitrator they had absolutely no role in
selecting."253 Others argue that requiring courts to oversee the
selection process is unnecessary because (1) the class attorney is
obligated by an ethical duty to act in the best interest of the entire
class by selecting a fair and unbiased arbitrator, (2) the arbitrator
has a duty to disclose any conflicts of interest that may lead to bias,
and (3) arbitration institutions have a strong financial incentive to
avoid even the appearance of bias.2" Further, the inability to select
an arbitrator is not necessarily a due process violation. When
litigating class actions, absent members do not "choose" which judge
will hear their case or in which venue the case is filed. However, the
right to participate in the selection of an unbiased decision maker
is central to arbitration, and even this preliminary step to class
arbitration has process implications.
2. The Right to an Unbiased Decision Maker
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[w]hen the
Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of
249. Sternlight, supra note 73, at 111-12.
250. Id.
251. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
252. Sternlight, supra note 73, at 112.
253. Id.
254. Thomas Burch, Comment, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer
Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1005, 1032-33. (2004)
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impartiality."255 This requirement of a neutral and unbiased
decision maker applies also when judges delegate their adjudicating
authority to arbitrators. 256 Numerous jurisdictions have expressly
adopted provisions mandating use of an unbiased arbitrator to
provide process fairness to the parties.257
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the arbitra-
tion procedure set forth in the parties' arbitration agreement was
not unconstitutional because it provided for minimal standards of
procedural fairness, including the right to a neutral arbitrator.258
Cole followed the guidelines set forth in Gilmer and found that due
process could be satisfied in arbitration when the parties' agreement
provided for neutral arbitrators and other specified requirements.259
Similarly, in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,
Inc., the Supreme Court of California created a list of certain
minimum standards that must be met in arbitration, with neutral-
ity of the arbitrator noted as its first consideration.26 °
255. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.7 (1953) (quoting Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950)).
256. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (holding that "due process requires a neutral and detached judge in
the first instance, and the command is no different when a legislature delegates adjudicative
functions to a private party" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Murray v. Wilner, 325 N.W.2d 422, 425, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that arbitrators
too must be unbiased to "satisfy the appearance of justice"), rev'd, 348 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1984);
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981) (holding that a neutral arbitrator
is essential to ensuring "minimum levels of integrity" in the arbitration process).
257. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (noting NYSE
arbitration rules and the FAA provide protections against biased arbitrators); Cole v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674, 682 (Cal. 2000).
258. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
259. Id. The court found that arbitration agreements satisfy due process when the
agreement
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal
discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief
that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require [parties] to
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition
of access to the arbitration forum.
Id.
260. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 674 (holding that for vindication of a party's statutory rights,
"the arbitration must meet certain minimum requirements, including neutrality of the
arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited
form of judicial review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration").
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Unlike the courts and some other arbitration institutions, the
FAA does not specify that private arbitration must satisfy due
process in this way. It does, however, permit a court to set aside an
award "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," or "evident
partiality ... in the arbitrators."261 In Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Co., a divided Supreme Court set aside an
arbitration award because one of three "neutral" arbitrators failed
to disclose that he had been employed by a contractor whose surety
was a party to the arbitration.21 2 The Court reasoned that arbitra-
tors must be subject to at least the same standards of impartiality
as judges because arbitrators are not constrained in applying
substantive law and are not subject to appellate review.2 63 Going
even further, several Michigan appellate courts have found that
even the appearance of bias is a violation of the Due Process Clause
when state-mandated medical malpractice arbitration required a
doctor or hospital administrator to serve as one of three
arbitrators.2" Because arbitrators have wide discretion in deciding
factual and legal issues, courts should not require a tremendous
amount of evidence from parties seeking to show not only the
appearance of bias but also the incapacity for fairness.
3. Class Certification
The Bazzle Court determined that the arbitrator, not the judge,
must determine whether the parties' arbitration agreement permits
classwide arbitration.' The Court did not address, however,
whether allowing the arbitrator to make this decision would affect
class members' due process rights. Class certification is critically
important because it determines who will be affected and how the
suit will be structured to ensure adequate protection of absentee
members' interests.266 In most consumer cases, class certification is
the "death knell" decision for the case altogether.6 7 Rule 23 and
261. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
262. 393 U.S. 145, 146, 150 (1968).
263. Id. at 148-49.
264. See Sternlight, supra note 149, at 88 & n.387 (citing cases).
265. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
266. Sternlight, supra note 73, at 112.
267. See supra Part I.A.1.
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similar state counterparts provide judges with explicit guidance for
protecting class members' rights. Although arbitrators may look to
the procedural rules for reference, this inquiry is merely optional.
Professor Sternlight questions arbitrators' expertise in handling
complex class proceedings and argues that certification by an
arbitrator does not comply with the Due Process Clause because
"judges are substantially burdened by the responsibility of protect-
ing the interests of absent class members, and .... [arbitrators] may
not yet have reached the point at which they are deemed equally
capable of protecting individuals' critical due process interests."268
While the AAA has adopted a "national roster of class arbitration
arbitrators"269 who are trained to handle class arbitration, the AAA
is only one of numerous arbitration institutions, and this attempted
self-governance does not ensure that the rights of absentee class
members will be protected in all instances.
4. The Right to Adequate Representation
In the context of a class action, whether adjudicated in court or in
arbitration, adequate representation of named class representatives
and class counsel is crucial, particularly because the proceedings are
less formal and generally not subject to full public or judicial
scrutiny."' Adequate representation in a class action can also serve
as a proxy for due process."' In arbitration, parties may play a
larger role in the direction of the proceedings. For due process to be
satisfied, and for the arbitrator's award to effectively bind absent
parties, the arbitrator must be certain that named representatives
adequately represent the class's interests at all times. Professor
Sternlight argues that the best way to ensure adequate represen-
tation of absent class members is to provide them the right to
representation by counsel. She posits that such representation
"might well be necessary in an arbitration, because of the ad-
268. Sternlight, supra note 73, at 113-14. But see Burch, supra note 254, at 1035 (indicating
that some arbitrators, such as those on the AAA roster, handle large, complex disputes).
269. See AM. ARBITRATION ASsN SUPP. R. FOR ARBITRATIONS 2(a).
270. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1940) (holding that due process was not
satisfied unless named plaintiffs adequately represent absent members at all times).
271. Cf Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,725-27,733 (1877) (describing the circumstances for
when in rem proceedings satisfy due process, even though no actual notice is served).
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versarial posture of the opposing parties [and because] the legal
and factual issues at stake in an arbitration may often be complex,
so that a party would benefit greatly from the assistance of an
attorney."
272
While the issue of class members' right to representation by
counsel has yet to be addressed by the courts, two of the most
prominent arbitration institutions have preemptively included
provisions in their arbitration rules that require the arbitrator to
determine and monitor the adequacy of representation in class
arbitration. Under the AAA's Class Rule 4(a), "the arbitrator shall
determine whether one or more members of a class may act in the
arbitration as representative parties on behalf of all members of the
class described."2 73 This determination must be made before the
arbitrator certifies the class. Similarly, JAMS, a large provider of
arbitration services, requires employee arbitration agreements to
"provide that an employee has the right to be represented by
counsel."274 These provisions may ward off due process attacks for
lack of adequate representation. While such action may be effective
when arbitration is conducted through one of these arbitration
institutions, there is no guarantee that the parties' claim will be
heard by either of them; and if it is not, there is no guarantee that
absent members will be adequately represented.
5. Other Process Issues Unique to Class Arbitration
As with judicial class actions, it is important to ensure fairness
of any settlement or final disposition of arbitral class claims. A
corresponding right to attend the proceedings should accompany the
notice provisions. And, although arbitrators do not typically provide
written opinions that explain their decisions, the process should
include a right to a reasoned decision.275 Without such a written
272. Sternlight, supra note 149, at 91. Restrictions and prohibitions in mandatory, binding
arbitration should therefore violate due process. See id.
273. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSN Supp. R. FOR ARBITRATIONS 4(a).
274. JAMS, POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS 2 (rev. 2005), available at http'J/www.jamsadr.com/images/pdf/employment
_arbitrationmin-std.pdf.
275. See Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 443, 444-45 (1998) (noting that arbitrators usually do not set forth the facts of
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decision, parties cannot effectively (1) appeal the award and submit
it for judicial review, or (2) govern their future behavior to avoid
such conflict. Because the FAA specifies several grounds on which
a court may vacate an arbitrator's award,27' a written opinion must
be available to the parties and the court to provide meaningful
review.
CONCLUSION
Congress must directly address, through the FAA, the increas-
ingly complex questions regarding class actions in arbitration,
including both the potential evisceration of class actions through
express contractual bans and the due process requirements for a fair
process in class arbitration. Due process rights of all class members
are implicated in class arbitration, as the rights of unnamed parties
are adjudicated and extinguished, and as the courts participate in
the process and enforce such arbitral awards. As a matter of
constitutional import, or simply political and practical necessity, a
modicum of fair process is required for arbitral class actions to
hold legitimacy. The FAA should therefore specify appropriate
procedures, incorporating the procedural standards of class
administration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and
should address the issues unique to arbitration regarding arbitrator
selection, neutrality, and the need for reasoned decisions to apprise
class members of the basis of the arbitral award. These procedures
should clarify the role of the court and arbitrator. The AAA Class
Rules attempt to balance an arbitrator's adjudicative responsibili-
ties under the parties' agreement to arbitrate with important
concerns to ensure a level of procedural fairness. Thus, the option
the case or the applicable substantive law in a detailed written opinion, and they do not
explain how the facts and law combine to produce the result the arbitrator has reached).
276. The FAA provides that the judge may vacate an arbitration award
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
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for judicial oversight remains essential to protect absent class
members and to give meaning to the principle that arbitration
merely changes the forum, not the substantive rights. Absent
congressional action, long overdue in reevaluating the FAA,
individual states should adopt procedures for class arbitration
requiring a minimal level of judicial recourse.
